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Mark Storslee† 
In the wake of Burwell v Hobby Lobby, religious accommodation has become 
increasingly controversial. That controversy has given rise to a new legal theory 
gaining popularity among academics and possibly a few Supreme Court justices: 
the idea that the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause condemns accommoda-
tions whenever they generate anything beyond a minimal cost for third parties. 
The third-party thesis is appealing. But this Article argues that there are 
good reasons to believe it fails as an interpretation of the Establishment Clause. In 
its place, the Article offers a new theory for understanding the relationship between 
costly accommodations and the Establishment Clause. That theory begins with a 
simple assertion: the Establishment Clause is not a prohibition on generic harm 
but instead a ban on government attempts to promote a favored religious identity. 
Thus, the fundamental inquiry is not whether a private party bears some cost but 
instead whether the government is using its power to foster religious conformity. 
Although largely overlooked in the literature, members of the Founding  
generation actually did equate accommodations with establishments on at least 
two occasions, both involving instances in which accommodations encouraged reli-
gious conformity. And as it turns out, the principles drawn from those incidents 
provide powerful explanations for many of the Court’s modern precedents—often 
more powerful than the Court’s own reasoning. But even more, viewing the  
Establishment Clause as a ban on government attempts to induce religious con-
formity also offers a more plausible way of thinking about the occasional costs of 
accommodation. This approach will be more deferential to legislative judgments 
than an approach focused squarely on harm. But that is not a reason for rejecting 
it, especially when the limits it provides have proven fairly reliable in dealing with 
the problem. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We occupy a unique moment in the story of American 
religious liberty. During the Founding period and for much of 
the twentieth century, it was widely accepted that religious 
accommodation—the practice of sometimes exempting religious 
individuals or groups from burdensome laws—was a desirable 
means of protecting free exercise.1 But as a matter of cultural 
consensus, that agreement seems to be quickly unraveling or at 
least entering a new period of uncertainty. As Professor Paul 
Horwitz has observed, “Contestation over religious 
accommodations has moved rapidly from the background to the 
foreground,” to the point that “[a]ccommodations by anyone—
courts or legislatures—have been called into question.”2 
 
 1 See, for example, Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Under-
standing of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv L Rev 1409, 1466 (1990) (noting that reli-
gious accommodations in the Founding period were seen as a “natural and legitimate 
response to the tension between law and religious convictions”); Philip A. Hamburger, A 
Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 Geo Wash L 
Rev 915, 916–17 (1992) (arguing that the Founding generation did not believe exemp-
tions were constitutionally required, but observing that “many Americans sympathized 
with their neighbors who had pious scruples about oaths, military service, and a few 
other legal requirements, and, therefore . . . expressly granted religious exemptions”). 
 2 Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 Harv L Rev 154, 159 (2014). 
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Of course, to anyone who reads the news with some regular-
ity, this is no longer a groundbreaking pronouncement. Burwell 
v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc3 was one of the more controversial 
cases in recent memory and seriously eroded support for ac-
commodation among many political progressives.4 Moreover, 
many perceive proposals to create or clarify religious accommo-
dation laws at the state level as broadside attacks on LGBTQ 
rights.5 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd v Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission6 reinforced that perception, though it did not in-
volve a religious accommodation law as such. Put simply, for a 
growing number of people, religious accommodation is increas-
ingly reducible to three words: license to discriminate. 
The tendency to view religious accommodation primarily in 
terms of the culture war is understandable. After all, religious 
liberty cases involving topics like contraception, gay rights, and 
abortion invariably draw greater media coverage than other dis-
putes and thus play an outsized role in public consciousness. 
But thinking about accommodation solely or even mostly in 
terms of the culture war presents some profound dangers. 
For one thing, it obscures the significant good that accom-
modation laws do for religious minorities. In addition to the fed-
eral Religious Freedom Restoration Act7 (RFRA) and the  
 
 3 134 S Ct 2751 (2014). 
 4 The literature either praising or criticizing Hobby Lobby is immense. For a small 
sampling of some particularly incisive critiques and defenses, compare William P. 
Marshall, Bad Statutes Make Bad Law: Burwell v Hobby Lobby, 2014 S Ct Rev 71,  
105–18 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) in Hobby Lobby); Kent Greenawalt, Hobby Lobby: Its Flawed 
Interpretive Techniques and Standards of Application, in Micah Schwartzman, Chad 
Flanders, and Zoë Robinson, eds, The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty 125, 128 
(Oxford 2016) (same), with Douglas Laycock, The Campaign against Religious Liberty, in 
Schwartzman, Flanders, and Robinson, eds, The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty 231, 
233–38 (defending the Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby); Brett H. McDonnell, The 
Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 Ariz L Rev 777, 780 (2015) (same); Amy J. Sepinwall, 
Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby’s 
Wake, 82 U Chi L Rev 1897, 1908–09 (2015) (arguing that Hobby Lobby was rightly 
decided as a doctrinal matter but questioning certain aspects of the Court’s reasoning). 
 5 See Fernanda Santos, Arizona Governor Vetoes Bill on Refusal of Service to Gays 
(NY Times, Feb 26, 2014), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/27/us/Brewer-
arizona-gay-service-bill.html (visited Nov 19, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable);  
Campbell Robertson and Richard Pérez-Peña, Bills on ‘Religious Freedom’ Upset Capi-
tols in Arkansas and Indiana (NY Times, Mar 31, 2015), online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/us/religious-freedom-restoration-act-arkansas-
indiana.html (visited Nov 19, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 6 138 S Ct 1719 (2018). 
 7 Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488 (1993), codified as amended at 42 USC 
§ 2000bb et seq. 
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Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act8 
(RLUIPA), there are twenty-one states that have similar general 
accommodation laws, colloquially known as mini-RFRAs.9 Yet 
the available evidence suggests that the vast majority of claims 
brought under these laws have nothing to do with topics like 
contraception, gay rights, or abortion.10 They are about hair 
length,11 headgear,12 horse-drawn buggies,13 beard trimming,14 
and so on. They are about making allowances for religious  
diets,15 or helping churches obtain suitable real estate,16 or al-
lowing small sects to use some banned substance.17 The culture 
war has rendered this universe of cases—and with them, the 
workaday benefits of accommodation—almost totally invisible. 
 
 8 Pub L No 106-274, 114 Stat 803 (2000), codified at 42 USC § 2000cc et seq. 
 9 See State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (National Conference of State 
Legislatures, May 4, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/4TBM-ZJEZ. Fourteen states 
have adopted standards similar to RFRA when interpreting their state constitutions. See 
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U Ill L Rev 839, 844 & 
n 22 (collecting citations). 
 10 See Luke W. Goodrich and Rachel N. Busick, Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An 
Empirical Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cases, 48 Seton Hall L Rev 353, 356, 384 
(2018) (conducting an empirical survey of cases in the Tenth Circuit thirty-two months 
after Hobby Lobby and concluding that there were “no RFRA challenges in the Tenth 
Circuit to any other medical procedures or drugs” and that “religious minorities are sig-
nificantly overrepresented in the cases relative to their population”); Stephanie H.  
Barclay and Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied Challenges? A De-
fense of Religious Exemptions, 59 BC L Rev 1595, 1634–36 (2018) (noting that an empiri-
cal assessment of the federal caseload shows that, even when counting challenges to the 
“contraception mandate” of the Affordable Care Act separately, such cases made up less 
than one-third of the total RFRA claims decided in the three years since Hobby Lobby). 
See also Douglas Laycock, The Wedding-Vendor Cases, 41 Harv J L & Pub Pol 49, 50–51 
(2018) (noting the relatively small number of culture war–related claims at the Supreme 
Court in free exercise cases decided since 1991). 
 11 A.A. v Needville Independent School District, 611 F3d 248, 272 (5th Cir 2010) 
(protecting the right of a kindergartener to wear his hair in accordance with his Native 
American religious beliefs). 
 12 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc, 
135 S Ct 2028, 2034 (2015) (reversing summary judgment granted in favor of an  
employer who refused to hire a Muslim applicant because she wished to wear a headscarf). 
 13 State v Hershberger, 462 NW2d 393, 399 (Minn 1990) (protecting the right of the 
Amish to use horse-drawn buggies without slow-moving-vehicle signage). 
 14 Holt v Hobbs, 135 S Ct 853, 859 (2015) (protecting the right of a Muslim inmate 
to maintain a half-inch beard). 
 15 Willis v Commissioner, Indiana Department of Correction, 753 F Supp 2d 768, 
782 (SD Ind 2010) (upholding a Jewish prisoner’s right to receive kosher meals). 
 16 Saints Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc v City of New Berlin, 
396 F3d 895, 901 (7th Cir 2005) (reversing summary judgment forbidding a church from 
building on a purchased parcel). 
 17 Gonzales v O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 US 418, 423 
(2006) (upholding the right of a Brazilian religious group to use a hallucinogenic tea in 
its rituals). 
2019] Religious Accommodation and Third-Party Harm 875 
 
But there is also a deeper problem. Viewing religious ac-
commodation primarily in terms of the culture war has created 
profound confusion about the meaning of the Establishment 
Clause. Under statutes like RFRA and RLUIPA, courts are re-
quired to deny an accommodation when doing so is the least re-
strictive means of furthering a compelling interest.18 As Justice 
Anthony Kennedy recently noted, that inquiry necessarily re-
quires courts to consider whether an accommodation “unduly re-
strict[s] other persons . . . in protecting their own interests.”19 In 
the shadow of Hobby Lobby, however, many have begun to argue 
that the Establishment Clause imposes a much more radical 
constraint. The proposal has been phrased in different ways and 
ornamented with different nuances, but we can summarize the 
position as follows: although legislatures may sometimes pro-
vide religious accommodations, the Establishment Clause for-
bids accommodations whenever they generate more than a min-
imal cost for “third parties,” meaning “persons who . . . do not 
believe or engage in the exempted religious practices.”20 Let’s 
call this the third-party thesis. 
The third-party thesis is appealing because it coheres with a 
powerful intuition that religion should not be “a license to harm 
others.”21 It also offers one possible reading of Supreme Court 
precedents suggesting that the Establishment Clause somehow 
limits accommodations that impact nonparticipating citizens.22 
Thus, it is no wonder that many distinguished scholars are em-
bracing the thesis,23 and even a few Supreme Court justices have 
 
 18 42 USC §§ 2000bb-1(a)–(b), 2000cc-1. 
 19 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2787 (Kennedy concurring). 
 20 Frederick Mark Gedicks and Rebecca G. Van Tassell, Of Burdens and Baselines: 
Hobby Lobby’s Puzzling Footnote 37, in Schwartzman, Flanders, and Robinson, eds, The 
Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty 323, 323 (cited in note 4). 
 21 Burt Neuborne, Madison’s Music: On Reading the First Amendment 135 (New 
Press 2015). 
 22 See generally Estate of Thornton v Caldor, Inc, 472 US 703 (1985); Cutter v  
Wilkinson, 544 US 709 (2005). See also Part II.B. 
 23 See, for example, Frederick Mark Gedicks and Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA 
Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of 
Religion, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev 343, 357–59 (2014); Gedicks and Van Tassell, Of Bur-
dens and Baselines at 323–30 (cited in note 20); Nelson Tebbe, Religious Freedom in an 
Egalitarian Age 49–70 (Harvard 2017); Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger, and 
Nelson Tebbe, The Establishment Clause and the Contraception Mandate (Balkinization, 
Nov 27, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/Z33W-DW8T. See also Brief for Amici Curiae 
Church-State Scholars Frederick Mark Gedicks, Caitlin Borgmann, Caroline Mala 
Corbin, Steven K. Green, B. Jessie Hill, Richard Schragger, Micah Schwartzman,  
Elizabeth Sepper, Nelson Tebbe, et al, in Support of the Government, Sebelius v Hobby 
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flirted with the idea.24 But there is a problem. Put simply, there 
are good reasons to believe the third-party thesis fails as an in-
terpretation of the Establishment Clause. 
At the level of principle, the third-party thesis relies primar-
ily on the claim that costly accommodations “tax” unwilling citi-
zens in ways akin to repressive state churches. But that analogy 
depends on both a dubious account of history as well as implau-
sible arguments about religious coercion.25 Unlike Founding-era 
church taxes, the purpose and effect of religious accommodation 
is to leave religion alone, not actively evangelize. Moreover,  
although accommodations that produce private costs might 
sometimes create resentment, they do not force anyone to sup-
port religion in any way that the law actually recognizes. 
Likewise, although the third-party thesis offers a nuanced 
set of rules for identifying forbidden accommodations, its 
framework is exceedingly difficult to square with the Court’s 
precedents.26 When considering cases involving both religious 
institutions and the religious conduct of individuals, the Court 
has repeatedly blessed accommodations that generate costs for 
others. Indeed, it has sometimes held that the Establishment 
Clause itself requires them. If the third-party thesis is right, 
much of our law—including some of the Court’s most celebrated 
religious liberty cases—would seem to be wrong. 
This Article offers a new theory for thinking about the rela-
tionship between the Establishment Clause and cost-shifting  
religious accommodations. This theory begins with a simple 
claim: the Establishment Clause is not a prohibition on harm 
 
Lobby Stores, Inc, Nos 13-354 and 13-356, *13–7 (US filed Jan 28, 2014) (available on 
Westlaw at 2014 WL 333891) (collecting the support of twenty-one constitutional law 
scholars in support of the thesis); Hillel Y. Levin, Why Some Religious Accommodations 
for Mandatory Vaccinations Violate the Establishment Clause, 68 Hastings L J 1193, 
1223–41 (2017) (applying a modified version of the third-party thesis to analyze exemp-
tions from vaccination requirements). Likewise, scholars who stop short of fully endors-
ing the thesis have nonetheless noted its importance. See, for example, Ira C. Lupu, 
Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 Harv J L & Gender 
35, 38 n 3 (2015) (referring to the third-party thesis as an “excellent elaboration” of 
“highly significant” Establishment Clause norms constraining accommodation), citing 
Gedicks and Van Tassel, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 356–71 (cited in note 23); Douglas 
NeJaime and Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in 
Religion and Politics, 124 Yale L J 2516, 2529–33 (2015) (acknowledging the thesis); 
Richard H. Fallon Jr, Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U Pa L Rev 59, 107–08 
(2017) (same). 
 24 See Holt, 135 S Ct at 867 (Ginsburg concurring). See also Part II. 
 25 See Part II.A. 
 26 See Part II.B. 
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but instead a ban on government attempts to promote a favored 
religious identity (either a particular religion or religion in gen-
eral). More specifically, it suggests that, when evaluating the 
propriety of religious accommodations, the fundamental inquiry 
is not whether a private party bears some cost but instead 
whether the government is using its power to foster religious 
conformity. 
Religious accommodations are attempts to protect minori-
ties by making room for religious practices that are unfamiliar 
to or unaccepted by the majority. Thus, the idea that accommo-
dations can somehow be equated with establishments is largely 
untenable—accommodations almost always weaken, rather than 
strengthen, the power of the state to promote a favored  
orthodoxy. But that is not the whole story. Although often over-
looked in the literature on religious accommodation, members of 
the Founding generation did equate accommodations with es-
tablishments on at least two occasions, both of which involved 
objections that the accommodations encouraged religious con-
formity.27 And reflection on those incidents yields two principal 
rules for limiting religious accommodations today. 
First, the Establishment Clause prohibits accommodations 
that seek to selectively subsidize the government’s preferred re-
ligious messages.28 Under this rule, although the government 
may provide accommodations to relieve burdens on religious 
practice, the Establishment Clause prohibits it from designing 
those accommodations to offer discriminatory support for the 
government’s preferred religious ideas. So, for example,  
although the government can make allowances for students in 
public schools to practice religion by providing release-time for 
religious instruction, it may not design the accommodation in a 
way that lends government prestige to the message being spo-
ken while conditioning eligibility on the substance of the reli-
gious teaching. 
Second, the Establishment Clause prohibits accommoda-
tions that provide exceptionally powerful incentives to adopt the 
religion being accommodated.29 Under this rule, when an ac-
commodation operates in ways analogous to a coercive law man-
dating religious conformity, the Establishment Clause requires 
that it be struck down or, more likely, modified to dissipate the 
 
 27 See Part III.A. 
 28 See Part III.A.1. 
 29 See Part III.A.2. 
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incentive. So, for example, when a religious accommodation in-
volves both objectively powerful incentives and widely held 
claims of conscience—as with exemptions from military service, 
for instance—there are heightened Establishment Clause con-
cerns over induced conformity that will sometimes require re-
moving or reducing the incentive. 
The two limitations described above provide convincing ex-
planations for many of the Court’s modern Establishment 
Clause precedents—in some cases, more convincing than the 
Court’s own reasoning.30 But more than this, viewing the  
Establishment Clause as a ban on government attempts to en-
courage religious conformity also offers a more plausible way of 
thinking about the occasional costs of accommodation. Specifi-
cally, it clarifies that, although these costs are not themselves a 
proper basis for an Establishment Clause objection, they can be 
relevant in determining whether a law is actually a genuine ac-
commodation rather than merely a pretext for rewarding reli-
gious conformity.31 So, for example, when an accommodation of-
fers gratuitous benefits to religious claimants or transgresses 
the limits that apply to similar constitutional claims, the Court 
has been right to suggest that the Establishment Clause is  
implicated. 
To be sure, this approach to the Establishment Clause will 
be more deferential to legislative judgments than an approach 
focused squarely on third-party harm. But that is not a reason 
for rejecting it, especially when other limits have proven fairly 
reliable in dealing with that problem. For instance, many ac-
commodation laws like RFRA and RLUIPA already contain a 
balancing test, the primary purpose of which is to safeguard 
other important interests.32 What is more, religious accommoda-
tions—like all cost-balancing legislation—are subject to amend-
ment or repeal through the political process. That fact has been 
important in recent controversies involving religious liberty and 
LGBTQ rights, in which political majorities have been exceed-
ingly active in shaping or limiting accommodations to protect 
those interests. A proper understanding of the Establishment 
Clause does not require ignoring the costs of accommodation. It 
simply requires that those costs be accounted for more carefully 
and managed through a variety of means. 
 
 30 See Part III.B. 
 31 See Part IV.A. 
 32 See Part IV.B. 
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This Article is organized as follows: Part I explains the ba-
sics of the law governing religious accommodation and its rela-
tionship to the Establishment Clause. Part II unpacks the prob-
lems with viewing the Establishment Clause as a prohibition on 
generic harm and offers a critique of the third-party thesis. In 
Part III, the Article offers a new approach for addressing the re-
lationship between cost-shifting accommodations and the  
Establishment Clause, arguing that the principal inquiry is 
whether an accommodation has the purpose or effect of fostering 
religious conformity. This Part discusses some historical inci-
dents often overlooked by scholars to introduce the principles 
governing the inquiry and goes on to explain their modern doc-
trinal implications. Finally, Part IV deals with some objections 
and explores other limits on religious accommodation. This Part 
begins by explaining the subsidiary role that costs sometimes 
play in identifying laws that transgress the Establishment 
Clause. Having done so, it goes on to consider other important 
limits on religious accommodation, especially those provided by 
the political process. 
Before proceeding to the heart of the argument, however, a 
few important clarifications are in order. First, in making an ar-
gument in favor of the Establishment Clause theory I outline 
above, this Article deals only with religious accommodations. By 
“accommodations,” I mean laws specifically designed to remove 
burdens on private religious practice. Those laws take two 
forms. Most commonly, accommodations provide exemptions 
from laws that would otherwise burden religiously motivated 
conduct. Alternatively, they protect free exercise by mandating 
that employers take reasonable steps to facilitate their  
employees’ religious needs or that the government take steps to 
allow people in its care to practice their religion. Beyond these 
categories of laws, this Article makes no specific claims. Thus, 
although I note that a concern about government-induced con-
formity runs through the Court’s Establishment Clause juris-
prudence, I do not attempt to offer a full defense of the principle 
as applied to other contexts. 
Second, in arguing in favor of the Establishment Clause  
limits I outline above, I have largely set to one side an important 
additional concern: the requirement that religious accommoda-
tions be neutral among religions, or what the Court has  
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sometimes called “denominational neutrality.”33 To be sure, this 
concern plays some role in considering whether an accommoda-
tion selectively favors the government’s preferred religious mes-
sages. But the prohibition on denominational discrimination  
also entails additional limitations.34 Because these concerns are 
only tangentially related to the issue of costly accommodations, 
however, I leave them mostly to the side. A full exploration of 
the requirement that religious accommodations treat all reli-
gions equally will have to be left for another day. 
I.  CURRENT LAW AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE BASICS 
The law of religious accommodation has undergone 
dramatic change in the last few decades. 
For much of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court in-
terpreted the Free Exercise Clause35 to require exemptions when 
a law burdened religiously motivated conduct unless the gov-
ernment could demonstrate that requiring compliance was the 
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest.36 In 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon 
v Smith,37 however, the Court changed course. Specifically, it 
held that the Constitution does not require heightened scrutiny 
when a law burdens religious practice so long as the conflict re-
sults from a “neutral law of general applicability.”38 The Smith 
rule has generated significant confusion of its own, but the basic 
point is this: so long as a law does not treat religious conduct 
less favorably than analogous secular conduct or contain oppor-
tunities for governmental discretion, Smith says the Free  
Exercise Clause generally does not require exemptions.39 
 
 33 Larson v Valente, 456 US 228, 246 (1982). 
 34 For instance, it prohibits a legislature from limiting accommodations out of a 
desire to exclude a disfavored religious group, even when the accommodation itself is 
formally neutral. See id at 253–55. 
 35 US Const Amend I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”). 
 36 See Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith, 
494 US 872, 893 (1990) (O’Connor concurring in the judgment) (explaining the Court’s 
previous free exercise jurisprudence). 
 37 494 US 872 (1990). 
 38 Id at 879, quoting United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 263 n 3 (1982) (Stevens  
concurring). 
 39 For a nice discussion of Smith and its possible meanings, see Douglas Laycock 
and Steven T. Collis, Generally Applicable Law and the Free Exercise of Religion, 95 Neb 
L Rev 1, 9–10 (2016). The Court itself has also complicated the Smith rule in ways that 
remain largely open-ended. See, for example, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
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Smith radically reduced the scope of protection for religious 
exercise provided under the Constitution. Yet as the Smith ma-
jority made plain, nothing in the ruling meant that such protec-
tions were thereby “banished from the political process.”40 On 
the contrary, in Smith and subsequent cases, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly reaffirmed its long-standing view that leg-
islatures may “accommodate religious practices . . . without vio-
lating the Establishment Clause.”41 
Legislatures have responded by enacting or strengthening 
many different kinds of religious accommodations. Some of  
these—such as laws allowing groups to use peyote in their reli-
gious services42 or the clergy-penitent privilege contained in 
most rules of evidence43—extend protections in specific contexts. 
But even more important are so-called “general” accommodation 
laws like RFRA and RLUIPA.44 Under those statutes and state 
laws like them,45 when a claimant demonstrates that a law “sub-
stantially burden[s]” her religious exercise, the government 
must grant an exemption unless it can demonstrate that enforc-
ing the law is the least restrictive means of furthering a compel-
ling governmental interest.46 
Accommodations have sometimes been subjected to whole-
sale Establishment Clause challenges. Yet the Court has re-
peatedly rebuffed those arguments, and often without a single 
dissent. As an introductory matter, two of the Court’s conclu-
sions are of particular importance. 
 
Church & School v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 US 171, 190 (2012) 
(holding that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits applying employment discrimination 
laws to claims involving a religious institution and its ministers, and distinguishing 
Smith as concerning “government regulation of only outward physical acts” rather than 
“an internal church decision”). 
 40 Smith, 494 US at 890. 
 41 Cutter v Wilkinson, 544 US 709, 713 (2005), quoting Hobbie v Unemployment 
Appeals Commission of Florida, 480 US 136, 144–45 (1987). 
 42 See 42 USC § 1996a(b)(1). 
 43 See Cox v Miller, 296 F3d 89, 102 (2d Cir 2002) (explaining that “every state has 
enacted the cleric-congregant privilege in some form”). 
 44 As Professor Kent Greenawalt explains, exemptions may be “specific” by apply-
ing to a particular law or “general” by offering a set of standards to a variety of laws. 
Kent Greenawalt, Exemptions: Necessary, Justified, or Misguided? 9 (Harvard 2016). 
 45 See note 9; Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty after Gonzales: A Look at 
State RFRAs, 55 SD L Rev 466, 473–79 (2010) (providing a basic overview of state 
RFRAs). 
 46 See 42 USC §§ 2000bb-1(a)–(b), 2000cc-1. See also Lund, 55 SD L Rev at 475–79 
(cited in note 45).  
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First, the Court has repeatedly held that religious accom-
modations do not violate the Establishment Clause merely be-
cause they “single[ ] out religious entities for a benefit.”47 That 
conclusion flows both from historical practice and from the text 
of the Constitution itself. Accommodations that single out reli-
gious exercise have always been ubiquitous in American law, be-
fore as well as after the adoption of the First Amendment.48 
Moreover, by its terms the Free Exercise Clause provides reli-
gious exercise with special protection not provided to other kinds 
of commitments. It follows as a matter of course that ordinary 
legislation adopting a similar approach is permissible under the 
Constitution. “Where . . . government acts with the proper pur-
pose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion,” 
the Court has said, “we see no reason to require that the exemp-
tion come packaged with benefits to secular entities.”49 
Second, religious accommodations do not violate the 
Establishment Clause merely because they “accommodate 
religion beyond free exercise requirements.”50 The reason, the 
Court has explained, stems from the “play in the joints” between 
the Religion Clauses—a zone of discretion that allows for “state 
actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required 
by the Free Exercise Clause.”51 Thus, although accommodations 
are not usually required by the Constitution after Smith, 
legislatures may choose to enact them without violating the 
Establishment Clause. 
Of course, saying that religious accommodation is generally 
permissible under the Establishment Clause is not to say the 
Constitution provides no limits. That is because, although genu-
ine accommodations cohere with the Constitution, attempts to 
promote the government’s favored religion do not. As the Court 
has put it, although the Establishment Clause provides “ample 
room” for religious accommodation, “[a]t some point, accommo-
dation may devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of religion.’”52 In 
the shadow of Hobby Lobby, however, several scholars have  
 
 47 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v Amos, 483 US 327, 338 (1987). See also Cutter, 544 US at 724. 
 48 See Horwitz, 128 Harv L Rev at 167 (cited in note 2) (“Accommodation of religion 
is an aboriginal feature of American public law.”). See also notes 169–71 and accompany-
ing text (describing several religious accommodations during the Founding period). 
 49 Amos, 483 US at 338. 
 50 Cutter, 544 US at 713. 
 51 Locke v Davey, 540 US 712, 718–19 (2004). 
 52 Amos, 483 US at 334–35, quoting Hobbie, 480 US at 145. 
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begun to suggest that the Establishment Clause imposes a much 
more stringent constraint. It is that theory, which I call the 
third-party thesis, that this Article turns to next. 
II.  THE THIRD-PARTY THESIS 
The crux of the third-party thesis can be stated simply:  
although religious believers (the “first” party) may sometimes 
receive exemptions from government (the “second” party), the 
Establishment Clause forbids accommodations that generate 
costs or burdens for “third parties,” meaning “persons who de-
rive no benefit from an exemption because they do not believe or 
engage in the exempted religious practices.”53 Thus, the argu-
ment goes, although accommodations are sometimes permissi-
ble, the Establishment Clause condemns accommodations that 
“shift the costs” associated with an underlying activity from “one 
private citizen onto another private citizen,” at least when those 
costs are more than negligible.54 
The third-party thesis is an attractive theory, not least be-
cause it draws on a widely shared intuition that religion should 
not be a “license to harm others.”55 And of course, that intuition 
is true as far as it goes. To state the obvious, no one thinks that 
religious believers or anyone else have the right to engage in 
murder, theft, or trespass. Yet the third-party thesis goes much 
further by suggesting that accommodations are constitutionally 
prohibited when they alter the distribution of private burdens in 
much less radical ways.56 In the wake of Hobby Lobby, that view 
 
 53 Gedicks and Van Tassell, Of Burdens and Baselines at 323 (cited in note 20). 
 54 Tebbe, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age at 50 (cited in note 23). Sup-
porters of the third-party thesis claim that their rule is also grounded in free exercise, 
yet the specifics of their arguments differ. Professor Frederick Gedicks and Rebecca G. 
Van Tassell rest their assertion mostly on the claim that the Court has sometimes in-
cluded dicta about harms to others in free exercise cases. See Gedicks and Van Tassell, 
Of Burdens and Baselines at 326 (cited in note 20) (arguing that two of the Court’s “free 
exercise decisions” have denied exemptions based on concerns over third-party burdens). 
By contrast, Professor Nelson Tebbe asserts that “the Free Exercise Clause itself . . . in-
corporate[s] the imperative of avoiding harm to others.” Tebbe, Religious Freedom in an 
Egalitarian Age at 59 (cited in note 23). In both accounts, however, the crucial claim is 
that costly accommodations “impose” one citizen’s faith on another. See id at 58, quoting 
United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 261 (1982); Gedicks and Van Tassell, Of Burdens and 
Baselines at 325 (cited in note 20). Because the Establishment Clause already prohibits 
impositions of religion, however, this Article deals with those arguments in that context. 
See Part II.A. 
 55 Neuborne, Madison’s Music at 135 (cited in note 21). 
 56 See text accompanying notes 114–18 (discussing the proposed thresholds to trig-
ger an Establishment Clause objection under the third-party thesis). 
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has attracted support from a number of distinguished legal aca-
demics.57 But even more importantly, it is also beginning to 
gather at least tepid support among some members of the  
Supreme Court.58 
In Holt v Hobbs,59 the Supreme Court unanimously held 
that a Muslim inmate seeking to grow a half-inch beard was en-
titled to an exemption under RLUIPA from a prison grooming 
policy.60 In a brief concurrence joined by Justice Sonia  
Sotomayor, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated that she joined 
the Court’s opinion because, “[u]nlike the exemption this Court 
approved in . . . Hobby Lobby, accommodating [the prisoner’s] re-
ligious belief . . . would not detrimentally affect others who do not 
share petitioner’s belief.”61 Justice Ginsburg did not explicitly 
mention the Establishment Clause in Holt. Yet her citations 
suggest that she may have been relying on the clause as the ba-
sis for her view.62 
In at least one important sense, Justice Ginsburg’s concur-
rence in Holt makes a valid point. In holding that religious 
businesses and their owners were entitled to an exemption from 
the “contraceptive mandate” under RFRA, the Hobby Lobby ma-
jority asserted that the cost to Hobby Lobby’s employees would 
be “precisely zero” because they could receive contraceptives di-
rectly from the government.63 But that assertion skated over the 
fact that many women were left without contraceptive coverage 
while the agency created an alternative program to deliver it.64 
It must be said that the gap in coverage was not the Court’s 
 
 57 See note 23 and accompanying text. 
 58 See note 24 and accompanying text. 
 59 135 S Ct 853 (2015). 
 60 Id at 859. 
 61 Id at 867 (Ginsburg concurring). 
 62 See id (Ginsburg concurring). See also Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2790 & n 8 
(Ginsburg dissenting) (citing several Establishment Clause precedents to argue that 
“[a]ccommodations to religious beliefs or observances . . . must not significantly impinge 
on the interests of third parties”); id at 2801 (pointing out that the Court has said that 
the Establishment Clause requires courts to “take adequate account of the burdens a 
requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries”) (quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted). Admittedly, not everyone reads Justice Ginsburg’s statement in Holt as 
linked to the Establishment Clause. For an alternative view, see Kevin C. Walsh, Did 
Justice Ginsburg Endorse the Establishment Clause Third-Party Burdens Argument in 
Holt v. Hobbs? (Mirror of Justice, Jan 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8P63-DJM6. 
 63 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2760. 
 64 For elaboration on this point, see Tebbe, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian 
Age at 67–70 (cited in note 23). 
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fault. But it is nonetheless true that the Hobby Lobby majority 
understated the costs of its ruling. 
At the same time, there is also reason for caution. Justice 
Ginsburg’s concurrence in Holt—like the academic argument in 
favor of the third-party thesis—proposes an aggressive 
Establishment Clause limit on religious accommodation as a 
direct response to Hobby Lobby. Yet as Professor Christopher 
Lund has noted, Hobby Lobby was an outlier.65 Most religious 
accommodation cases have nothing to do with topics like 
abortion or contraception. They are about things like protecting 
the right of the Amish to use buggies without signage,66 
protecting the right of Native American and Muslim individuals 
to wear their hair or beards in accordance with their religion,67 
protecting the right of churches to maintain their ministries in 
the face of onerous zoning regulations,68 and allowing clergy to 
maintain their confidences in the face of subpoenas.69 And when 
one considers that larger world of cases, the idea that the 
Constitution prohibits any accommodation that “detrimentally 
affects others” becomes exceedingly difficult to sustain. 
Consider just a few examples. Laws regulating zoning pro-
tect the property values of specific homeowners. But they also 
regularly prohibit churches or mosques from carrying on their 
ministries, and especially from providing services to the home-
less.70 Are exemptions from such laws, which RLUIPA regularly 
requires, now an Establishment Clause violation because they 
adversely affect neighborhood traffic flows or home values? 
Likewise, laws regulating animal slaughter instantiate the val-
ues of animal rights groups who believe certain practices are in-
humane or environmentally irresponsible. Yet without specific 
exemptions, those laws conflict with the kosher requirements of 
 
 65 Christopher C. Lund, Keeping Hobby Lobby in Perspective, in Schwartzman, 
Flanders, and Robinson, eds, The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty 285, 288–89 (cited 
in note 4) (observing that Hobby Lobby and other culture war cases are “highly unrepre-
sentative” yet are “driving the discussion on both the left and the right”). 
 66 State v Hershberger, 462 NW2d 393, 399 (Minn 1990). 
 67 A.A. v Needville Independent School District, 611 F3d 248, 253 (5th Cir 2010) 
(protecting the right of a Native American kindergartener to wear his hair in accordance 
with his religious beliefs); Holt, 135 S Ct at 859 (protecting the right of a Muslim inmate 
to maintain a half-inch beard). 
 68 Chosen 300 Ministries, Inc v City of Philadelphia, 2012 WL 3235317, *26–27 (ED 
Pa) (allowing a church to continue its homeless ministry in the face of zoning challenges). 
 69 Mockaitis v Harcleroad, 104 F3d 1522, 1530 (9th Cir 1997). 
 70 See, for example, United States v County of Culpeper, 245 F Supp 3d 758, 769 
(WD Va 2017); Chosen 300 Ministries, 2012 WL 3235317 at *26–27. 
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many observant Jewish communities. Are exemptions from such 
laws—which have been recognized and praised by the Supreme 
Court71—actually unconstitutional? What about religious ex-
emptions from the Americans with Disabilities Act?72 From the 
Copyright Act?73 From the Fair Housing Act?74 The list goes on 
and on. 
To be sure, Justice Ginsburg probably did not have all these 
laws in mind when she penned her concurrence in Holt. But that 
is precisely the point. The argument that the Establishment 
Clause forbids any accommodation that “detrimentally affects 
others” might sound appealing when we are thinking only about 
Hobby Lobby. But when we widen the frame even slightly, it be-
comes apparent that such a rule would require a full-scale revo-
lution in our law. 
Of course, revolution might not be a bad thing. If the third-
party thesis is a correct interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause, as several scholars now contend, such a change is long 
overdue. Thus, it is worth considering the arguments for the 
third-party thesis in more detail. 
A. The Church-Tax Analogy 
At the level of Establishment Clause principle, the most 
prominent argument in favor of the third-party thesis relies on 
an analogy to mandatory tax support for churches. Specifically, 
proponents argue that religious accommodations violate the  
Establishment Clause whenever they shift burdens to others be-
cause such burdens “function[ ] as a tax on nonadherents to 
support someone else’s religious beliefs.”75 So for example, 
 
 71 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v City of Hialeah, 508 US 520, 539 
(1993), citing 7 USC § 1902(b). 
 72 Pub L No 101-336 § 307, 104 Stat 363 (1990), codified at 42 USC § 12187. 
 73 Pub L No 94-553 § 101, 90 Stat 2549 (1976), codified as amended at 17 USC 
§ 110(3). 
 74 Pub L No 90-284 § 807, 82 Stat 84 (1968), codified as amended at 42 USC 
§ 3607(a). 
 75 Gedicks and Van Tassell, Of Burdens and Baselines at 334 (cited in note 20). See 
also Tebbe, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age at 52 (cited in note 23) (arguing 
that opposition to religious taxes indicates that “the founding generation . . . committed 
themselves to the idea that the costs of accommodating the faith of some citizens should 
not be imposed on citizens of other faiths or no faith”). The original version of this argu-
ment appeared in Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case 
against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U Pa L Rev 555, 593 (1991) (sug-
gesting that accommodations involving costs can sometimes be analogized to “coercive 
taxation to support the religious practices of others”). 
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whenever an accommodation requires “the denial of employee 
entitlements and protections to facilitate an employer’s practice 
of religion, this denial functions as a tax on employees to sup-
port the employer’s religion.”76 
On a first read, the church-tax analogy is fairly convincing. 
Most obviously, it identifies an aversion to “paying for religion” 
that is common among some citizens, and it transforms that 
aversion into a legal argument by drawing an analogy between 
accommodation and a practice that virtually everyone agrees is 
unconstitutional. But on closer examination, the analogy be-
tween church taxes and accommodation is superficial. The pur-
pose and effect of religious accommodation is to leave religion 
alone or, more specifically, to avoid impinging on free exercise by 
removing legal impediments or combatting private discrimina-
tion. In church-tax schemes, by contrast, the government uses 
its power not to protect religious freedom but instead to actively 
evangelize.77 And it was that fact—not the bare association of re-
ligion and unwanted cost—that motivated historical objections 
to religious taxes. 
To illustrate the point, consider the debate over Virginia’s 
General Assessment. In the wake of American independence, 
members of the Virginia legislature proposed a tax on citizens to 
support clergy members of their choosing or educational institu-
tions within the commonwealth.78 Opposing the assessment, 
supporters of religious liberty such as James Madison argued 
that requiring even “three pence” for support of a minister was 
indistinguishable from full-blown religious establishment.79 But 
that argument was not based on the idea that any undesired 
cost associated with religion should be prohibited. Instead,  
Madison’s argument was much simpler. Tax-support schemes 
were objectionable because they effectively deprived all citi-
zens—those who gave to churches willingly and those who did 
 
 76 Gedicks and Van Tassell, Of Burdens and Baselines at 335 (cited in note 20). 
 77 See Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 Harv J 
L & Gender 103, 145 (2015) (noting that laws requiring church attendance and tax sup-
port involved “compulsion to engage in a religious practice” and “remove[d] no legal bur-
den on [any] faith and thus serve[d] no free exercise interest”). 
 78 A Bill “Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion,” 1784, 
Virginia House of Delegates (Dec 24, 1784), reprinted in Thomas E. Buckley, S.J., 
Church and State in Revolutionary Virginia, 1776–1787 188 (Virginia 1977). 
 79 James Madison, To the Honorable General Assembly of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia: A Memorial and Remonstrance (1785), reprinted in Robert S. Alley, ed, James 
Madison on Religious Liberty 55, 57 (Prometheus 1985). 
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not—of the freedom to “render to the Creator such homage and 
such only as [they] believe[d] to be acceptable to him.”80 In other 
words, religious taxes were equivalent to establishment not be-
cause they forced some people to pay for religion they did not 
like but because they effectively forced everyone to engage in a 
religious observance—namely, tithing.81 Taxing people solely to 
support the religious functions of churches is no different from 
coerced worship. But no one in the Founding generation ever so 
much as hinted that this problem had anything to do with reli-
gious accommodations. 
Of course, one possible response is to concede the historical 
point but argue that costly accommodations infringe on liberty 
in an analogous way. And indeed, supporters of the third-party 
thesis have suggested as much by arguing that accommodations 
generating costs “compel[ ] citizens . . . to support an article or 
manifestation of faith.”82 Here too, however, it is worth drilling 
down. Proponents of the thesis tend to be vague about how the 
costs of some accommodations coerce others to “support” an arti-
cle of religious faith. But the claim seems to imply two possibili-
ties: either these costs are a forced religious observance or they 
are compelled speech. Yet like the historical claim, both of these 
arguments become problematic on closer examination. 
As we have already observed, forced payment to support a 
minister is a religious observance in the most literal sense—it is 
a tithe. But that is simply not the case for the incidental costs 
associated with religious accommodation. Granting a church an 
exemption from zoning laws might have a detrimental effect on 
home values or traffic flows, but it is a far cry from forcing any-
one to practice a religion. Protecting a religious employee who 
wishes to attend a worship service might increase the cost of 
running a business, but it doesn’t require anyone to observe a 
 
 80 Id at 56. 
 81 As part of that argument, Madison also denied that the law actually allowed in-
dividuals to avoid giving to a church by giving their money to education. See id at 56. 
Again, however, Madison’s argument was that the assessment denied non-Christians the 
“equal freedom” to refrain from worshipping. Id at 57. In Madison’s words, it forced them 
to “embrace, to profess and to observe” the Christian religion, presumably because even 
Virginia’s seminaries of learning possessed ecclesial ties. Id at 57. See also Frederick 
Rudolph, The American College and University: A History 16 (Georgia 1962) (observing 
that the president of the College of William and Mary was a representative of the Bishop 
of London and head of the Anglican Church of Virginia). 
 82 Tebbe, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age at 54 (cited in note 23). See also 
Gedicks and Van Tassell, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 363 (cited in note 23). 
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Sabbath. In these circumstances and others, a secular cost or 
burden is just that. 
The argument about subsidized speech fares no better, 
though it probably lies closest to the heart of the church-tax 
analogy.83 Under the Court’s precedents, government is some-
times forbidden from forcing private individuals to “fund[ ] [ ] 
the speech of other private speakers or groups.”84 So for instance, 
individuals cannot be forced to pay for the speech of unions or 
for private advertising with which they disagree.85 In those  
cases, however, government is directly coercing one party to re-
distribute resources to another with the purpose of facilitating 
the latter’s expression. A law requiring public sector employees 
to pay for a union’s speech forcibly transfers wealth from the 
former to the latter,86 a law requiring lawyers to fund the ideo-
logical messages of bar associations takes money out of their 
pockets and puts it in the associations’ coffers,87 and so on. But 
when we are talking about the incidental costs of protecting 
rights, things are very different. 
Think about just a few examples from the free speech con-
text. Upholding a Nazi’s right to march in Skokie88 may be con-
troversial, but no one thinks that, by doing so, the Supreme 
Court embraced a fascist ideology or required the citizens of  
Illinois to do so. Likewise, requiring a particular community to 
pay for increased police presence at a white supremacist rally—
which the First Amendment does89—will undoubtedly be unpop-
ular. But we would never say that the First Amendment is  
“taxing” citizens to support the Ku Klux Klan. The First 
Amendment allows hate groups to protest at military funerals, 
but we do not think that means government has coerced  
attendees to “support” such speech.90 The reason for all these 
 
 83 See Micah Schwartzman, Nelson Tebbe, and Richard Schragger, The Costs of 
Conscience, 106 Ky L J 781, 787 & n 21 (2017–2018) (citing the Supreme Court’s  
compelled subsidy precedents to argue that, “when [ ] costs fall on a discrete group of cit-
izens, they can rightly complain that they are being coerced as a matter of conscience”). 
 84 Knox v Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, 567 US 298, 309 
(2012), citing Abood v Detroit Board of Education, 431 US 209, 222–23 (1977). 
 85 See Janus v American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, 
Council 31, 138 S Ct 2448, 2460 (2018). See also United States v United Foods, Inc, 533 
US 405, 413 (2001). 
 86 See Janus, 138 S Ct at 2464. 
 87 See Keller v State Bar of California, 496 US 1, 13–14 (1990). 
 88 See National Socialist Party of America v Village of Skokie, 432 US 43, 44 (1977). 
 89 See Forsyth County v Nationalist Movement, 505 US 123, 133 (1992). 
 90 See Snyder v Phelps, 562 US 443, 460 (2011). 
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judgments is simple: in all these instances, although the costs 
associated with speech may generate frustration, they do not ac-
tually impinge on anyone’s right to refrain from speaking. The 
costs are ancillary to the protection of a freedom, not the product 
of a law compelling redistribution to pay for speech.91 
What is true of traditional free speech cases is also true of 
costly religious accommodations. Like protecting Nazi speech or 
funeral protesters, protecting someone else’s ability to practice 
her religion may sometimes be detested or even abhorred,  
especially when it entails costs. But in those instances—as in 
most free speech cases—the costs generated are purely inci-
dental. A zoning accommodation for a mosque might impact a 
particular homeowner, but it doesn’t command a monetary 
transfer from one speaker to another. An accommodation requir-
ing a private employer to accommodate her employee’s religious 
needs might invoke resentment. But it doesn’t require her to pay 
her employee for religious speech; it merely requires that she 
adjust workplace rules to account for things like religious dress 
or Sabbath observance. Those kinds of incidental costs do not 
force anyone to endorse a religion. They are simply part of the 
cost we all sometimes bear in a republic in which many sorts of 
freedom are prized and valued.92 
Like the historical claim, then, the arguments about reli-
gious coercion underlying the church-tax analogy sound plausi-
ble. But on further inspection, they also lack any real grounding. 
Although accommodations carrying costs sometimes generate 
resentment, they simply do not require anyone to “support” reli-
gion in any way that the law actually recognizes. 
But is there yet another way to understand the church-tax 
analogy? As an add-on to their arguments about religious coer-
cion, supporters of the third-party thesis have sometimes sug-
gested that costly accommodations violate the Establishment 
 
 91 Direct government coercion requiring one speaker to subsidize another’s expres-
sion is an essential element of any subsidized speech case. See Micah Schwartzman, 
Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 Va L Rev 317, 380 (2011) (observing that the “general 
logic of compelled support doctrine” begins with the claim that “government cannot force 
people to speak” and subsequently asserts that “financial contributions for expressive 
purposes are treated either as intrinsically expressive or as facilitating expression”). See 
also Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 Stan L Rev 1, 37 (2016) (argu-
ing that the logic of the Court’s compelled speech precedents involves asking “whether a 
compelled subsidy exacts a disproportionate sum for speech activities in light of any non-
speech purposes”). 
 92 For an elegant explanation of this point, see Richard W. Garnett, Accommoda-
tion, Establishment, and Freedom of Religion, 67 Vand L Rev En Banc 39, 48–49 (2014). 
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Clause by fostering “unequal citizenship” on the basis of reli-
gion.93 According to this argument, “When one group is ‘taxed’ so 
that another group may be accommodated in their observance, 
citizens are stratified on the basis of belief.”94 
As a matter of course, government may not punish or oth-
erwise discriminate against citizens on the basis of their reli-
gion. To cite just one paradigmatic example, government may no 
more forbid a minister from holding elected office than it may 
prohibit an atheist from doing so.95 But it is doubtful that reli-
gious accommodations—even those that inadvertently generate 
costs for others—transgress this principle. We do not think that 
the government is stratifying according to sex when it accom-
modates pregnant women or commands private employers to do 
so.96 Nor do we think that government is fostering unequal citi-
zenship in favor of individuals with disabilities when it requires 
accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act.97 
Rather, the government is simply choosing to defend groups or 
activities that may be underprotected through free-market 
mechanisms. If the legislature adds a religious accommodation 
alongside these others, the inference of protection-not-
stratification would seem to be no different, even if the accom-
modation—like these others—generates costs. 
To be sure, one might respond by suggesting that, unlike 
these other categories, religion is especially dangerous and polit-
ically divisive.98 That intuition was the one that fueled some ver-
sions of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s endorsement test and its 
suggestion that the Establishment Clause prohibits “send[ing] a 
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full mem-
bers of the political community” and vice-versa.99 But there is a 
problem here too. As even some supporters of the third-party 
 
 93 Tebbe, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age at 54 (cited in note 23). 
 94 Schwartzman, Tebbe, and Schragger, 106 Ky L J at 787 (cited in note 83). 
 95 See McDaniel v Paty, 435 US 618, 629 (1978) (holding that a state law barring 
ministers from serving as delegates to a state constitutional convention violated the Free 
Exercise Clause); Torcaso v Watkins, 367 US 488, 496 (1961) (holding that a state consti-
tutional provision requiring public officials to declare their belief in the existence of God 
violated the First Amendment). 
 96 See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub L No 95-555, 92 Stat 2706 (1978),  
codified at 42 USC § 2000e(k). 
 97 104 Stat 327, 42 USC § 12112(a)–(b). 
 98 See Tebbe, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age at 54 (cited in note 23)  
(arguing that costly accommodations are especially objectionable because they risk  
“dividing and stratifying the political community along religious lines”). 
 99 Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor concurring). 
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thesis have recognized, an Establishment Clause rule focused on 
division and alienation is unworkable as a basis for constitu-
tional decision-making.100 In a democracy in which majorities set 
the order of the day, it is all but inevitable that those in the mi-
nority will sometimes feel like outsiders. What is more, aliena-
tion and division seem inescapable when it comes to religion in 
particular. The Court’s School Prayer Cases undoubtedly pro-
tected religious liberty, but they also alienated those who believe 
that government-sponsored prayer or Bible reading are im-
portant features of public education.101 Rightly understood, a 
concern over government endorsement of particular religious 
views has merit. But the idea that we can build Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence around avoiding strife—and especially 
strife around religion—seems highly implausible. 
But for the sake of argument, let’s entertain the idea. Even 
assuming a focus on alienation represents a workable method of 
constitutional adjudication, the argument derived from political 
divisiveness is at best indeterminate when applied to cost-
shifting accommodations. Indeed, there is good reason to think it 
cuts in favor of such accommodations, not against them. 
Critics emphasizing “religious stratification” or “unequal cit-
izenship” highlight the perspective of a private party who bears 
some cost as a result of an accommodation.102 But why should we 
privilege that perspective? As already noted, in the post–New 
Deal world, government can and does redistribute costs to ac-
commodate a variety of important interests: pregnancy, disabil-
ity, and many others. And judged against this backdrop, the 
idea that it may never offer such protections to religious inter-
ests solely because they are religious does not avoid division. It 
 
 100 See, for example, Andrew Koppelman, Defending American Religious Neutrality 
47 (Harvard 2013) (critiquing this version of the endorsement test on the grounds that 
“political division is an unavoidable part of life in a democracy”). See also Richard W. 
Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 Georgetown L J 1667, 1723–24 
(2006) (providing the canonical version of this critique). 
 101 See School District of Abington Township v Schempp, 374 US 203, 223 (1963); 
Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421, 424 (1962). For a critique of the Court’s School Prayer Cases 
along these lines, see Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Decline of American Religious Free-
dom 131 (Harvard 2014) (observing that prohibiting school prayer necessarily “reject[ed] 
the views of citizens who believe on religious grounds that school prayer is desirable or 
obligatory”). There is no doubt that Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test condemns laws 
that alienate religious adherents just as much as those that alienate nonadherents. See 
Lynch, 465 US at 688 (O’Connor concurring) (noting that the test condemns “government 
endorsement or disapproval of religion”) (emphasis added). 
 102 See, for example, Tebbe, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age at 54 (cited in 
note 23). 
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exacerbates it. Justice William Brennan memorably observed 
that “[t]he Establishment Clause does not license government to 
treat religion and those who teach or practice it, simply by vir-
tue of their status as such, as subversive of American ideals and 
therefore subject to unique disabilities.”103 Singling out religion 
for special exclusion might strike some as enforcing equality. 
But it could just as well be—and increasingly is—considered  
evidence of outright hostility.104 Moreover, religious accommoda-
tion itself is designed to reduce social conflict by defusing  
clashes between government regulation and religious practice in 
situations in which the government’s interests can yield. To the 
extent that the church-tax analogy depends on arguments about 
“divisiveness” or “stratification,” it is a weak reason for revolu-
tionizing our law. 
B. The Court’s Precedent 
There are good reasons to question whether the third-party 
thesis rests on a sound Establishment Clause theory. But even 
setting that point aside, it still remains to be seen whether the 
thesis is viable under the Court’s precedent. 
Proponents of the third-party thesis rely primarily on two 
precedents as the basis for their theory. The first is Estate of 
Thornton v Caldor.105 In Caldor, the Supreme Court struck down 
a Connecticut law declaring that no employee could be required 
to work on a day that her religious tradition observed as a  
Sabbath.106 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger 
concluded that the law violated the Establishment Clause be-
cause of its “unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observ-
ers.”107 According to Chief Justice Burger, the statute improperly 
mandated that “Sabbath religious concerns automatically  
 
 103 McDaniel, 435 US at 641 (Brennan concurring in the judgment). 
 104 See, for example, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc v Comer, 137 S Ct 
2012, 2025 (2017) (concluding that excluding a church from “a public benefit for which it 
is otherwise qualified, solely because it is a church, is odious to our Constitution . . . and 
cannot stand”). See also id at 2027 (Breyer concurring) (explaining that the Constitution 
forbids government from excluding churches from “participation in a general program 
designed to secure or to improve the health and safety of children” when “[t]he sole  
reason [ ] that explains the difference is faith”). 
 105 472 US 703 (1985). 
 106 Id at 710–11. 
 107 Id at 710. 
894 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:871 
 
control over all secular interests” and risked placing “significant 
burdens” on employers and other employees.108 
The second precedent is Cutter v Wilkinson.109 In Cutter, the 
Court unanimously concluded that RLUIPA, the accommodation 
applying to prisons,110 was permissible under the Establishment 
Clause. The Court reiterated its broad view that “government 
[may] accommodate religion beyond free exercise requirements, 
without offense to the Establishment Clause.”111 In so holding, 
the Court reasoned that RLUIPA complied with the  
Establishment Clause in part because the statute requires 
courts to “take adequate account of the burdens a[n] [ ] accom-
modation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.”112 Citing Caldor, the 
Court declared that “an accommodation must be measured so 
that it does not override other significant interests.”113 
As should be apparent, Caldor and Cutter fall far short of  
offering an unambiguous pronouncement on the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause, much less a declaration about third-
party harm as a core principle. But proponents of the thesis 
have offered three criteria to transform the language of these 
cases into a workable Establishment Clause test. 
First, they insist that the Establishment Clause is violated 
only when an accommodation “shift[s] meaningful harms to 
identifiable others” as opposed to merely creating a cost for the 
public at large.114 So, for example, an accommodation for Sabbath 
observers that requires the government to pay additional 
unemployment benefits would not violate the Establishment 
Clause, but one that required specific employers to incur the 
same cost would. Let’s call this the redistribution requirement. 
Second, they assert that their Establishment Clause limit 
does not apply when “a preexisting burden on third parties [i]s 
marginally increased” as a result of an accommodation.115 So, for 
example, although draft exemptions for religious objectors have 
 
 108 Id at 709–10. 
 109 544 US 709 (2005). 
 110 See text accompanying note 59–60. 
 111 Cutter, 544 US at 713. 
 112 Id at 720. 
 113 Id at 722, citing Caldor, 472 US at 709–10. 
 114 Tebbe, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age at 55 (cited in note 23). See also 
Frederick Mark Gedicks and Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption 
for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 Vand L Rev En Banc 51, 56 
(2014) (arguing that accommodations that “increase [ ] the pre-existing tax burden”  
differ from those that inadvertently shift costs to “a limited, narrow, and discrete class”). 
 115 Gedicks and Van Tassell, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 363 (cited in note 23). 
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sometimes been thought to impose significant burdens on  
others, supporters of the third-party thesis reject this argument 
because “all potential draftees were already subject to a sub-
stantial risk of being drafted,” and the causal connection be-
tween exempting one person and drafting another is simply too 
attenuated.116 Let’s call this the causation requirement. 
Third, supporters of the thesis argue that their  
Establishment Clause rule does not apply when costs or burdens 
on others fall below a minimal threshold. Some claim that the 
Establishment Clause prohibits any accommodation that  
imposes a “material” burden on others, meaning a burden that is 
“relevant to [ ] decisions about how to act in some relevant 
way.”117 Others insist that the proper inquiry is whether an ac-
commodation imposes an “undue hardship” on others, by which 
they mean a burden that is “more than [ ] de minimis.”118 In  
either case, the point is the same: the Establishment Clause is 
triggered only when the burdens shifted to others cross a fairly 
low bar. Let’s call this the weightiness requirement. 
Notwithstanding some conceptual overlap, these three re-
quirements offer an elegant way of operationalizing the Court’s 
rather opaque language in cases like Caldor and Cutter. Yet on 
further examination, they also reveal significant problems with 
the third-party thesis. Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the conclu-
sion that, if the third-party thesis is right, several of the Court’s 
most celebrated religious liberty cases are almost surely wrong. 
1. The religious institution cases. 
To begin, consider Corporation of Presiding Bishop of 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v Amos.119 In Amos, 
the Court unanimously concluded that Title VII’s exemption al-
lowing religious organizations to hire only members of their own 
religion was permissible under the Establishment Clause.120 In 
 
 116 Gedicks and Koppelman, 67 Vand L Rev En Banc at 56–57 (cited in note 114). 
See also Gedicks and Van Tassell, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 363–64 (cited in note 23); 
Tebbe, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age at 57–58 (cited in note 23). 
 117 Gedicks and Van Tassell, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 366 (cited in note 23). 
 118 Tebbe, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age at 63 (cited in note 23). See also 
Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman, and Richard Schragger, How Much May Religious 
Accommodations Burden Others?, in Holly Fernandez Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen, and  
Elizabeth Sepper, eds, Law, Religion, and Health in the United States 215, 219–23 
(Cambridge 2017). 
 119 483 US 327 (1987). 
 120 Id at 339–40. 
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doing so, the Court squarely rejected the claim of a plaintiff who 
claimed that the exemption forced him to choose between “con-
forming to certain religious tenets or losing a job opportunity.”121 
If any case implicated the third-party thesis, Amos was it. 
The situation in Amos met the redistribution requirement 
because the cost of the accommodation was borne directly by the 
terminated employee. It satisfied the causation requirement 
because the exemption clearly placed a new burden on the 
employee by depriving him of an otherwise available statutory 
protection. And the facts of Amos met the weightiness 
requirement because the cost to the employee as a result of the 
exemption was more than de minimis. Yet the Court explicitly 
rejected the Establishment Clause challenge. If the third-party 
thesis is right, Amos is almost surely wrong. 
An even more difficult version of the problem arises when 
one considers Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church & School v 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.122 In Hosanna-
Tabor, a teacher at a church-affiliated school brought a discrim-
ination lawsuit after the school dismissed her, claiming she was 
fired because of a medical condition. The Court unanimously re-
jected the teacher’s claim by applying what is known as the 
“ministerial exception,” a constitutionally mandated exemption 
that bars discrimination lawsuits relating to the hiring and  
firing of a religious organization’s leaders.123 In rejecting the 
teacher’s claim, the Court held that the ministerial exception is 
required under both Religion Clauses whenever a law creates 
“government interference with an internal church decision that 
affects the faith and mission of the church.”124 
Like Amos, Hosanna-Tabor falls squarely within the third-
party thesis. The redistribution requirement was satisfied be-
cause the cost of the exemption was borne by the teacher whose 
discrimination claim was rejected. Moreover, there was no prob-
lem satisfying either the causation requirement or the weighti-
ness requirement. On any reading of the case, the ministerial 
exception deprived the teacher of the right to prove she was dis-
criminated against, and the cost to her financial and reputational 
interests was significant. Yet in Hosanna-Tabor, the Court 
 
 121 Id at 340 (Brennan concurring in the judgment). 
 122 565 US 171 (2012). 
 123 Id at 188–89. 
 124 Id at 190. 
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didn’t ignore the Establishment Clause. It unanimously declared 
that the Establishment Clause commanded this result. 
Proponents of the third-party thesis have tried to explain 
these inconsistencies away. But their explanations are uncon-
vincing. For instance, some argue that Amos is an “exception” to 
the third-party thesis that was justified by the need to protect 
“the church’s associational rights.”125 But the whole point of the 
Establishment Clause challenge in Amos was that the exemp-
tion went far beyond any association-based rationale—after all, 
the plaintiff was a janitor at the church-affiliated gym, not a re-
ligious leader.126 Likewise, others have suggested that Amos is 
consistent with the third-party thesis because it rests on a 
church autonomy right growing out of, but not mandated by, ei-
ther the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause.127 
But if the accommodation in Amos was not required by the  
Constitution, it is very difficult to see why an appeal to free ex-
ercise or nonestablishment “interests” should trump an actual 
Establishment Clause rule against third-party harm. 
The explanations for Hosanna-Tabor are even less satisfy-
ing. Some proponents of the theory argue that the third-party 
thesis did not apply in that case because the result in Hosanna-
Tabor was mandated by the Constitution, and “[i]t would make 
little sense to find that the affirmative command of the Free  
Exercise Clause facially violates the negative prohibition of the 
Establishment Clause.”128 But the fact that the thesis leads to a 
clash between the Religion Clauses is not a reason to apply one 
clause rather than the other. On the contrary, it is strong evi-
dence that this interpretation of the Establishment Clause is 
likely incorrect. Perhaps recognizing this problem, others have 
 
 125 Tebbe, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age at 56–57 (cited in note 23). See 
also Gedicks and Van Tassell, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 370–71 (cited in note 23) (argu-
ing that Amos “gave [ ] religious nonprofit organizations the same right held by secular 
cause-based nonprofits to discriminate in favor of employees who affirm and live accord-
ing to the principles on which the organization is founded”). 
 126 See Boy Scouts of America v Dale, 530 US 640, 648 (2000) (observing that an 
expressive association has the right to resist forced inclusion of an unwanted person but 
only if “the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group’s ability to 
advocate public or private viewpoints”). For an interesting take on the complicated 
relationships between religious organizations and nonadherents, especially in the 
context of providing social services, see generally Thomas C. Berg, Partially Acculturated 
Religious Activity: A Case for Accommodating Religious Nonprofits, 91 Notre Dame L 
Rev 1341 (2016). 
 127 See Gedicks and Van Tassell, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 369–70 (cited in note 23). 
 128 Id at 356. See also id at 368 n 118 (noting that Hosanna-Tabor is a “mandatory 
accommodation”). 
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suggested that Hosanna-Tabor’s violation of the third-party  
thesis was justified by the church’s overriding interest in free-
dom of association, much like the argument about Amos.129 But 
as even proponents of that view acknowledge, the Court in  
Hosanna-Tabor explicitly rejected the association rationale as the 
basis for its decision.130 What is more, the Court unanimously 
held that its decision was commanded by the Establishment 
Clause. Thus, we are left mostly where we started. If the third-
party thesis is right, the Court’s unanimous decisions in both 
Amos and Hosanna-Tabor must be wrong. 
2. The religious conduct cases. 
The third-party thesis also faces significant difficulties 
when compared to the Court’s cases involving accommodations 
for religious conduct. Here, a good starting place is Wisconsin v 
Yoder,131 one of the Court’s most celebrated free exercise cases. 
In Yoder, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause re-
quired an exemption for Amish parents from laws requiring that 
children attend school until the age of sixteen. In ruling in favor 
of the religious claimants, the Court acknowledged that accom-
modations may at times be limited by the Establishment 
Clause.132 Yet the Court was adamant that “[such] danger can-
not be allowed to prevent any exception no matter how vital it 
may be to . . . the right of free exercise.”133 
Supporters of the third-party thesis contend that their rule 
did not apply in Yoder because the causation requirement was 
not satisfied: the Court found that it was “highly speculative” 
that the exemption would leave children “ill-equipped for life.”134 
But focusing on that language diverts attention from the more 
obvious cost-shifting that Yoder presented. As the Court ob-
served, the mandatory school attendance regime was clearly de-
signed to protect children and their “substantive right . . . to a 
 
 129 Tebbe, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age at 57 (cited in note 23). 
 130 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 US at 189 (2012) (stating that the association rationale 
is “hard to square with the text of the First Amendment itself, which gives special solici-
tude to the rights of religious organizations”). See also Tebbe, Religious Freedom in an 
Egalitarian Age at 86 n 10 (cited in note 23). 
 131 406 US 205 (1972). 
 132 See id at 220–21. 
 133 Id at 221. 
 134 Id at 224. See also Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger, and Micah Schwartzman, 
Reply to McConnell on Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause (Balkinization, Mar 
30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/K4CE-T9GX. 
2019] Religious Accommodation and Third-Party Harm 899 
 
secondary education.”135 Yet the Court did not view deprivation 
of this right as a reason to deny the exemption. On the contrary, 
the Court silently accepted that its ruling might well deny 
schooling to an unwilling child, but nonetheless concluded that 
the exemption was appropriate because it did not present “any 
harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the pub-
lic safety” sufficient to constitute a compelling interest.136 Once 
again, if the third-party thesis is right, Yoder seems to be wrong. 
There is also a deeper sense in which the Court’s religious 
conduct cases present significant difficulties for the third-party 
thesis. Recall that, under the redistribution requirement, there 
is a firm distinction between accommodations that shift costs to 
discrete private parties and those that merely impose a cost on 
the government or the public at large. But as we have already 
seen, the primary Establishment Clause theory supporting the 
thesis involves an analogy to church taxes: accommodations that 
shift costs to others violate the Establishment Clause because 
they function like taxes requiring one person to pay for another 
person’s religion.137 Yet if the problem with cost-shifting accom-
modations is that they function like religious taxes, it is difficult 
to see why accommodations using actual tax dollars are ac-
ceptable but those that incidentally generate costs for some 
smaller group are not.138 
 
 135 Yoder, 406 US at 229. 
 136 Id at 230. In holding as much, the Court noted that only one of the three children 
involved in the case provided any testimony as to whether she shared her parents’ con-
victions. See id at 231 n 21; id at 237 (Stewart concurring). 
 137 See Part II.A. 
 138 Supporters of the third-party thesis argue in favor of the distinction by insisting 
that the Establishment Clause is not implicated when the costs of an accommodation are 
“widely distributed among a large and indeterminate class.” Gedicks and Koppelman, 67 
Vand L Rev En Banc at 56 (cited in note 114). See also Schwartzman, Tebbe, and 
Schragger, 106 Ky L J at 786 (cited in note 83) (arguing that there is a firm distinction 
between “[g]overnment tax[ing] the public to provide kosher meals to Jewish inmates” 
and “[g]overnment tax[ing] nonreligious inmates to provide kosher meals to Jewish in-
mates”). But given their underlying theory, it is difficult to see why that matters. After 
all, Madison famously suggested that being forced to pay even “three pence” was just as 
objectionable as any other form of establishment. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance 
at 57 (cited in note 79). As already noted, Madison’s argument is best understood as in-
sisting that forced religious observances (even trivial ones) are odious to religious free-
dom. See notes 80–81 and accompanying text. But proponents of the third-party thesis 
read arguments like Madison’s as condemning all forms of unwilling support for religion. 
And if that is so, there seems little reason to think the objection dissipates because the 
cost to any particular citizen is minimal. 
 What is more, there is good reason to think that the distinction between accommoda-
tions involving general taxes and those involving targeted costs is itself largely illusory. 
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Of course, the most obvious way to address this difficulty 
would be to widen the third-party thesis to prohibit any accom-
modation that generates costs, no matter who bears them. The 
moment we do so, however, an even larger number of the Court’s 
religious conduct precedents become inexplicable. The Court has 
repeatedly upheld religious accommodations that involve state 
benefits despite the fact that they cost taxpayers money.139 It has 
endorsed accommodations that use tax dollars to provide kosher 
meals for inmates and provide chaplains for members of the mil-
itary.140 And most recently, it has said that the government can 
pay for medical benefits like contraception when religious em-
ployers are exempted from doing so.141 Yet the third-party thesis 
would seem to imply that all those cases were also wrongly de-
cided, or at least rest on dubious grounds. 
A similar problem plagues the causation requirement.  
Remember that, under this requirement, a religious accommo-
dation does not violate the Establishment Clause unless it im-
poses a new burden (as opposed to a nontraceable increase in 
some existing burden). Proponents of the thesis have used this 
 
For example, accommodation claims involving unemployment compensation require the 
government to pay for benefits when a claimant’s religious practice conflicts with a re-
quirement that she be available to work on Saturdays. Yet those accommodations also 
inevitably involve a private cost: “Unemployment compensation is generally experience-
rated, so an employer’s unemployment tax payments are tied to the number claims the 
employer has to pay out.” Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemp-
tions, 46 UCLA L Rev 1465, 1513–14 & n 154 (1998). For an insightful discussion of this 
same point in the prison context and the many other instances in which the distinction 
between accommodations involving general taxes and those involving targeted costs 
breaks down, see Stephanie H. Barclay, First Amendment Categories of Harm, 95 Ind L J 
*26–33 (forthcoming 2020), archived at http://perma.cc/X2DX-BPDG. 
 139 See, for example, Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398, 407–09 (1963) (holding that the 
government could not deny unemployment compensation to a claimant for refusing to 
work on Saturday because of her religious beliefs); Thomas v Review Board of the  
Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 US 707, 720 (1981) (holding that the gov-
ernment’s denial of unemployment compensation violated a claimant’s free exercise 
rights when his religious beliefs forbade him from producing weapons); Hobbie v  
Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida, 480 US 136, 146 (1987) (holding that a 
state’s denial of unemployment compensation to a claimant who refused to work on the 
Sabbath violated her free exercise rights); Frazee v Illinois Department of Employment 
Security, 489 US 829, 835 (1989) (same). 
 140 See Cutter, 544 US at 721 & n 10 (2005) (acknowledging that RLUIPA would 
likely require religiously compliant meals and indicating that such accommodations are 
appropriate). See also id at 722 (noting and praising the Army chaplaincy program). For 
an insightful discussion on this point, see Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions, 
Third-Party Harms, and the False Analogy to Church Taxes, 106 Ky L J 679, 681–82 
(2017–2018). 
 141 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2781–82. 
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requirement to explain why draft exemptions from military ser-
vice fit their rule: because individuals can’t draw a clear causal 
link between exempting a particular conscientious objector and 
being drafted themselves, the third-party thesis doesn’t apply. 
But this explanation is also illusory. As Professor William  
Marshall has shown, in modern draft lotteries like those used 
during the Vietnam War, we actually can draw a line between 
particular draftees and particular objectors.142 And in response, 
supporters of the thesis have quietly hinted that, under their 
rule, conscientious exemptions from military service (religious 
as well as secular) very likely violate the Establishment Clause 
as well.143 So the Court’s famous Draft Cases144 also appear to be 
wrongly decided. But more than this: the venerable practice of 
granting exemptions from military service that existed at the 
Founding and has continued throughout the country’s history 
has likely been unconstitutional all along. 
There is a pattern here. Supporters of the third-party thesis 
claim the theory is consistent with the Court’s precedents. But 
on closer inspection, that claim—like the theoretical  
justification—falls short. To be sure, there is a sense in which 
the costs of accommodations are relevant to assessing their con-
stitutionality, as I explain in more detail below.145 To make sense 
of the problem, however, we need to start in a different place. 
III.  LIMITING RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION 
Neither constitutional principle nor the Supreme Court’s 
precedent supports the idea that religious accommodations vio-
late the Establishment Clause because they generate costs. This 
is not to say, however, that the Establishment Clause has noth-
ing to say about accommodations that impact others. On the 
 
 142 As Marshall explains, the lottery system involved assigning numbers seriatim to 
potential draftees, who were then drafted in numerical order until the government’s 
manpower needs were satisfied. Thus, exempting religious objectors with low numbers 
from combat service necessarily meant that some individuals with higher numbers 
would not have been called but for the exemptions. For more explanation on this point, 
see William P. Marshall, Third-Party Burdens and Conscientious Objection to War, 106 
Ky L J 685, 706 (2017–2018). 
 143 See, for example, Schwartzman, Tebbe, and Schragger, 106 Ky L J at 805 (cited 
in note 83) (“[T]o the extent conscientious objectors to military service impose harms on 
identifiable third parties, others can rightfully complain about the fairness of having to 
carry those burdens.”). 
 144 See United States v Seeger, 380 US 163, 165–66 (1965); Welsh v United States, 
398 US 333, 343–44 (1970) (Black) (plurality). 
 145 See Part IV.A. 
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contrary, the Establishment Clause is deeply concerned with 
certain kinds of costs associated with accommodation—most 
fundamentally, those that play a role in fostering religious con-
formity. This Part explains that limitation first by discussing 
some general Establishment Clause doctrine, then by exploring 
several important incidents from Founding-era history involving 
the connection between accommodations and religious estab-
lishments. Having done so, it turns finally to a more detailed 
discussion of the Court’s precedents. 
A. Against Religious Conformity 
The word “establishment” implies social control. When peo-
ple speak about the “literary establishment,” the “political es-
tablishment,” or even just “the establishment,” they mean not 
just that a group holds power but also that its power has a role 
in shaping the behavior of others. And whether the relevant or-
thodoxy involves social niceties, artistic conventions, or political 
opinions, all establishments do the same thing. They pressure 
people to conform. 
This concern over social control—and especially  
government-induced conformity—was prominent in Founding-
era descriptions of religious establishment. For instance, Baptist 
minister John Leland, one of the most important supporters of 
the Religion Clauses in James Madison’s home state of Virginia, 
observed that the aim of religious establishment is to “establish 
some standard of orthodoxy, to effect uniformity.”146 As Leland 
described it: “Uninspired, fallible men make their own opinions 
tests of orthodoxy, and use their own systems, as Pocrustes used 
his iron bedstead, to stretch and measure the consciences of all 
others by.”147 
Others echoed the same point. In his famous statute for re-
ligious freedom, Thomas Jefferson complained that establish-
ments stem from “the impious presumption of legislators,” who 
“set[ ] up their own opinions and modes of thinking as the only 
true and infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them on 
others.”148 Moreover, Jefferson made clear that his concern in-
volved not just punishments but also government’s efforts to 
 
 146 John Leland, The Rights of Conscience Inalienable, reprinted in L.F. Greene, ed, 
The Writings of the Late Elder John Leland 177, 184 (G.W. Wood 1845). 
 147 Id at 182. 
 148 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, June 18, 1779, 
reprinted in Julian P. Boyd, ed, 2 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 545 (Princeton 1950). 
2019] Religious Accommodation and Third-Party Harm 903 
 
promote a favored religion by “bribing, with a monopoly of 
worldly honours and emoluments, those who will externally pro-
fess and conform to it.”149 
The emphasis on social control was also a central theme 
unifying the historical practices associated with religious estab-
lishments. As several scholars have observed, these practices—
begun in England and often carried over to the American  
context—included governmental control over religious doctrine, 
mandatory attendance at worship services, limitations on the re-
ligious activities of dissenters, public financial support for fa-
vored churches, and religious limitations on eligibility for office 
and participation in public life.150 The shape of these practices 
and their administration differed from colony to colony and also 
changed over time as Americans wrestled over the meaning of 
“establishment” and expanded rights for religious dissenters.151 
But despite differences in application, it seems clear that these 
practices all aimed at “government control over religion” and, 
more specifically, “the promotion and inculcation of a common 
set of beliefs through government authority.”152 When rulers 
wanted to control their subjects, controlling the religious beliefs 
of the populace was—and continues to be—a powerful tool.  
The same worry about government-induced conformity was 
also a primary motivating force behind the adoption of the  
Establishment Clause specifically. Many Anti-Federalists  
worried that, given the scope of the national government’s pow-
ers, Congress might, “if they shall think it for the ‘general wel-
fare,’ establish an uniformity in religion throughout the United 
States.”153 Thus, when explaining the draft that eventually  
 
 149 Id at 546. 
 150 See, for example, Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at 
the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm & Mary L Rev 2105, 2131–81 
(2003) (documenting these practices); Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Reli-
gious Behavior and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 Notre 
Dame L Rev 1793, 1798–1803 (2006) (same). 
 151 For one important account of these changes, see generally Thomas J. Curry, The 
First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of the First Amendment  
(Oxford 1986). See also Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment 
Clause, 77 NYU L Rev 346, 398–405 (2002) (exploring differences in colonial practice but 
emphasizing a common concern with liberty of conscience).  
 152 McConnell, 44 Wm & Mary L Rev at 2207, 2131 (cited in note 150). 
 153 Essay by Deliberator, Philadelphia Freeman’s Journal (Feb 20, 1788), reprinted 
in Herbert J. Storing, ed, 3 The Complete Anti-Federalist 176, 179 (Chicago 1981). For a 
discussion of Anti-Federalist arguments along this line and their relation to other argu-
ments against the Constitution, see Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the 
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became the Religion Clauses, Madison stated that he believed 
the addition to the Constitution was necessary because “people 
feared one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine to-
gether, and establish a religion to which they would compel oth-
ers to conform.”154 From the first, the Establishment Clause was 
understood as a limit on government’s ability to control the reli-
gious lives of its citizens.155 
But concern over government-induced religious conformity 
is not just a historical artifact. It has also been a prominent 
theme in the Court’s modern Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence. In the School Prayer Cases, for instance, the Court fa-
mously concluded that the Establishment Clause forbids  
government-initiated religious exercises in public schools.156 In 
so holding, the Court announced that the Establishment Clause 
prohibits government from exerting “indirect coercive pressure 
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially 
approved religion.”157 As Justice Brennan explained it, “[T]he 
Establishment Clause permits little doubt that its prohibition 
was designed comprehensively to prevent those official involve-
ments of religion which would tend to foster . . . religious wor-
ship or belief.”158 
A similar theme condemning attempts to foster religious 
conformity runs through the Court’s cases regarding funding for 
religious institutions. In Zelman v Simmons-Harris,159 the Court 
made plain that government may choose to fund religious 
 
Establishment Clause and the Impossibility of Its Incorporation 8 U Pa J Const L 585, 
614–19 (2006). 
 154 1 Annals of Congress 758 (Aug 15, 1789). Two printings exist of the first two vol-
umes of the Annals of Congress. The first printing with the running head “History of 
Congress” conforms to the remaining volumes of the series, while the second printing 
with the running head “Gales & Seaton’s history of debates in Congress” is unique. See 
Checklist of United States Public Documents 1789–1909 1463 (Government Printing  
Office 3d ed 1911). All page citations herein are to the latter printing. Readers with the 
“History of Congress” printing can find parallel citations by referring to the date. 
 155 In this sense, the focus of the Establishment Clause has always been about limit-
ing government power, not securing individual rights. See Carl H. Esbeck, The  
Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Government Power, 84 Iowa L Rev 1, 
3 (1998) (explaining that the Establishment Clause, like other structural provisions in 
the Constitution, protects rights by “constraining the . . . government to act only within 
the scope of [its] delegated powers”). 
 156 See School District of Abington Township v Schempp, 374 US 203, 223 (1963); 
Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421, 424 (1962). 
 157 Engel, 370 US at 431. 
 158 Schempp, 374 US at 234 (Brennan concurring). 
 159 536 US 639 (2002). 
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schools alongside others without violating the Establishment 
Clause.160 Central to that holding, however, was the Court’s  
caveat that such programs must not “deliberately skew[ ] incen-
tives” in favor of religious schools.161 While programs of “true 
private choice” are acceptable under the Establishment Clause, 
programs that are gerrymandered to encourage the state’s pre-
ferred religious activity are not.162 
Likewise, although the Court’s cases involving displays of 
religious symbols are often confused, they also can be read to fol-
low the same pattern. Indeed, the recurring element in all these 
cases seems to be whether the “context of the display” indicates 
a “governmental effort substantially to promote religion.”163 To 
be sure, the justices do not agree as to what the relevant base-
line should be. But whether it involves past historical practice,164 
“ceremonial deism,”165 or a general version of the endorsement 
test,166 the limit seems to be the same: government may some-
times speak in ways that include religion, but it may not “prose-
lytize on behalf of a particular religion.”167 
Given all of this, it should be no surprise that the Court has 
said that there is “ample room” for religious accommodation un-
der the Establishment Clause.168 The reason is simple: accom-
modations almost always weaken, rather than strengthen, the 
power of the state to foster religious uniformity. Indeed, it is no 
exaggeration to say that, as a practice, accommodation stands in 
direct opposition to religious establishment. Whereas establish-
ments exist to encourage the state’s preferred religion, accom-
modations preserve free exercise by minimizing the govern-
ment’s power over religious activity. 
 
 160 Id at 653. 
 161 Id at 650. 
 162 Id at 649. 
 163 Van Orden v Perry, 545 US 677, 701, 703 (2005) (Breyer concurring in the  
judgment). 
 164 See McCreary County v American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 US 844, 
894 (2005) (Scalia dissenting) (arguing that “[h]istorical practices” demonstrate that 
“there is a distance between the acknowledgment of a single Creator and the establish-
ment of a religion”). 
 165 Elk Grove Unified School District v Newdow, 542 US 1, 36–37 (2004) (O’Connor 
concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that this concept distinguishes permissible reli-
gious symbols from impermissible ones). 
 166 See, for example, Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668, 687–94 (1984) (O’Connor  
concurring) (explaining this approach). 
 167 County of Allegheny v American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh  
Chapter, 492 US 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 168 Amos, 483 US at 334. 
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That theme is also consistent with history. The earliest reli-
gious accommodations provided exemptions from state-
sponsored worship.169 Those exemptions left dissenters free to 
practice their religion. But they also limited the ability of gov-
ernment to manage dissemination of religious ideas. Likewise, 
accommodations from oath requirements during the Founding 
period ensured that citizens with religious objections could still 
testify in court or hold public office.170 But more basically, they 
prevented government from cooperating with an established 
church to exclude religious minorities from political life. Even 
exemptions from militia service shored up the idea that, as  
Congress put it, government had the right to demand from its cit-
izens only forms of service “consistent[ ] with their religious prin-
ciples.”171 From the beginning, religious accommodation—like  
disestablishment—weakened the state’s power to promote a  
favored orthodoxy or link religious membership to political power. 
But what about instances in which the relationship between 
accommodation and government-induced religious conformity 
was more complicated? Generally, commentators besides those 
advocating for the third-party thesis have focused on the fact 
that accommodations were “never part of the establishment.”172 
But that emphasis has neglected an important subsidiary point: 
members of the Founding generation did equate accommoda-
tions with establishments on at least two occasions, both of 
which involved situations in which an accommodation risked 
promoting rather than discouraging religious conformity. My 
contention is that, although these historical incidents fall short 
of providing conclusive proof of the original meaning of the  
Establishment Clause, they nonetheless offer significant insight 
into how religious accommodations should be limited under the 
clause today. 
 
 169 See Laycock, 81 Notre Dame L Rev at 1803–04 (cited in note 150) (discussing 
these exemptions). 
 170 See McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1467–68 (cited in note 1) (discussing these 
exemptions); Laycock, 81 Notre Dame L Rev at 1804–05 (cited in note 150) (same). 
 171 Resolution of July 18, 1775, in Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed, 2 Journals of the 
Continental Congress, 1774–1789 187, 189 (GPO 1905). 
 172 See, for example, Laycock, 81 Notre Dame L Rev at 1803 (cited in note 150). See 
also McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1511 (cited in note 1) (suggesting that “[t]here is no 
substantial evidence that [ ] exemptions were considered constitutionally questionable [ ] 
as a form of establishment”). 
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1. Virginia’s General Assessment. 
The first incident occurred during the debate over Virginia’s 
General Assessment. As observed in the discussion of the third-
party thesis, the assessment was a targeted tax that would have 
required all citizens of Virginia to support “a Minister or Teacher 
of the Gospel . . . [or] places of divine worship.”173 Yet the bill  
also contained two provisions specifically designed to placate ob-
jections from dissenters. First, it provided citizens the right to 
direct their taxes to a church of their choice or, if no such desig-
nation was made, to “seminaries of learning within the  
Counties.”174 Second, it provided a specific exemption for  
Quakers and Mennonites that allowed them to use the funds col-
lected for any purpose, rather than limiting their use to pay-
ment of a minister or the maintenance of church buildings.175 
The assessment drew support from many in Virginia, in-
cluding George Washington, who favored its goal of “preserv[ing] 
the peace of society” through “the general diffusion of Christian 
knowledge.”176 But Madison and Jefferson took a different view. 
Madison made an impassioned speech to the Virginia legislature 
at the close of the 1784 session opposing the assessment.177 He 
also repeated many of those arguments the next year in his now-
famous Memorial and Remonstrance.178 
Madison began his Memorial and Remonstrance by rejecting 
the conclusion of Washington and others that the assessment 
did not impinge on religious liberty. He first observed that 
because “[i]t is the duty of every man to render to the Creator 
such homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to 
 
 173 A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion at 189  
(cited in note 78). 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id at 188. When George Mason wrote to Washington to request that he sign a 
remonstrance opposing the assessment, Washington replied:  
Although no man’s sentiments are more opposed to any kind of restraint upon 
religious principles than mine are, yet I must confess, that I am not amongst 
the number of those, who are so much alarmed at the thoughts of making peo-
ple pay towards the support of that which they profess, if of the denomination 
of Christians, or declare themselves Jews, Mahometans, or otherwise, and 
thereby obtain proper relief.  
Letter from George Washington to George Mason (Oct 3, 1785), in Worthington Chauncey 
Ford, ed, 10 The Writings of George Washington 1782–1785 506 (G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1891). 
 177 For the notes of Madison’s speech, see James Madison, Notes on Debate (Dec 
1784), in Alley, ed, James Madison on Religious Liberty at 54–55 (cited in note 79). 
 178 Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance at 55 (cited in note 79). 
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him,” it is “the right of every man” to exercise religion only as 
conscience dictates.179 Madison subsequently argued that the 
assessment “abridged” that right because it required each 
citizen to tithe whether such an action was warranted by 
conscience or not.180 “Who does not see,” Madison reasoned, “that 
the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three 
pence . . . may force him to conform to any other establishment 
in all cases whatsoever?”181 
Yet Madison also went much further. Specifically, he 
contended that, besides being a forced religious observance, the 
assessment also “violate[d] that equality which ought to be the 
basis of every law.”182 For our purposes, the most important part 
of that argument was Madison’s claim that the assessment 
granted “peculiar exemptions.” Madison continued: 
Are the Quakers and Menonists the only sects who think a 
compulsive support of their Religions unnecessary and un-
warrantable? Can their piety alone be entrusted with the 
care of public worship? Ought their Religions to be endowed 
above all others with extraordinary privileges by which 
proselytes may be enticed from all others?183 
Madison ended the argument by pleading with Quakers and 
Mennonites not to be seduced by the offer of “pre-eminences over 
their fellow citizens.”184 
There is little doubt that, by using the language of “pre-
eminences” and “extraordinary privileges,” Madison intended to 
draw an analogy between the accommodation for Quakers and 
Mennonites and traditional religious establishments.185 
Nonetheless, commentators have generally dismissed this 
section of the Memorial and Remonstrance as unprincipled 
political posturing. The reason, so it is said, is that Madison’s 
argument was disingenuous: Quakers and Mennonites had no 
formal clergy and thus would have had little use for money to 
 
 179 Id at 56. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id at 57. 
 182 Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance at 57 (cited in note 79). 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 In so arguing, Madison was explicitly rejecting the assessment’s assertion that it 
provided support for religion “without counteracting the liberal principle heretofore 
adopted and intended to be preserved by abolishing all distinctions of preeminence 
amongst the different societies or communities of Christians.” A Bill Establishing a 
Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion at 188 (cited in note 78). 
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pay a minister.186 But that dismissal overlooks the crucial way in 
which Madison thought that accommodations offering 
“privileges by which proselytes may be enticed” could be 
analogized to establishments.187 
The important point concerns the contours of the exemption 
and its connection to proselytizing. Contrary to arguments by 
many commentators, the assessment didn’t just excuse Quakers 
and Mennonites from using tax revenues to pay a minister. It 
excused them from all limitations imposed on the funds and in-
stead allowed them to use the money “in a[ny] manner . . . calcu-
lated to promote their particular mode of worship.”188 That per-
mission had an important consequence. Whereas other religious 
groups were constrained to use the tax to pay for only internal 
church functions—clergy salaries or worship spaces—Quakers 
and Mennonites were free to use the money to actively recruit 
converts by financing missionary activities, pamphlets, or other 
forms of proselytizing.189 In short, the exemption resembled an 
establishment because it ensured that only those religious 
groups possessed the “extraordinary privilege[ ]” of using gov-
ernment money to propagate their message to those outside the 
faith.190 
 
 186 See, for example, Steven D. Smith, Blooming Confusion: Madison’s Mixed 
Legacy, 75 Ind L J 61, 65–66 (2000) (making this argument); Buckley, Church and State 
in Revolutionary Virginia, 1776–1787 at 133–34 (cited in note 78) (same); Gene R. 
Nichol, Establishing Inequality, 107 Mich L Rev 913, 922 (2009) (same). See also 
McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1454 (cited in note 1) (labeling the passage “ambiguous”). 
 187 Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance at 57 (cited in note 79). 
 188 A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion at 189  
(cited in note 78). 
 189 Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance at 57 (cited in note 79). See also Edward 
L. Bond, ed, Spreading the Gospel in Colonial Virginia: Sermons and Devotional Writ-
ings 27 (Lexington 2004) (noting that Quakers in eighteenth century Virginia were “en-
ergetic proselytizers, and they sought to draw converts . . . by distributing Quaker reli-
gious tracts to the colony’s many unchurched and underchurched settlers”). 
 190 The idea that members of the Virginia legislature would want to support  
Quakers and Mennonites over all other dissenting sects may seem curious. But a possi-
ble explanation is deducible from the religious situation in Virginia at the time the as-
sessment was being debated. It was no secret that, like Quakers, Baptists in Virginia 
vehemently objected to church taxes for ministers. Yet Baptists were also hated by the 
Virginia gentry. Whereas by the 1780s Quakers had been accepted as a peaceful and in-
dustrious people, Baptists were described as “swarms” of gnats and radicals who “cannot 
meet a man upon the road . . . [without] ram[ming] a text of Scripture down his throat.” 
See id at 26, 35–36. Nonetheless, Baptists were easily the fastest growing religious 
group in Virginia. Id at 36. Allowing Quakers and Mennonites to proselytize using gov-
ernment dollars was unlikely to threaten the de facto Anglican establishment in  
Virginia. But supporters may have thought it could slow the “torrent” of Baptist con-
verts. Id at 36. 
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To be sure, one might question whether this reading of  
Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance is just wishful thinking. 
After all, Madison failed to explain his argument about the ex-
emption for Quakers in any detail, which might suggest the rhe-
torical interpretation is the right one. But other evidence sug-
gests that the problem is actually historical distance: Madison’s 
argument sounded much more familiar to his contemporaries 
than it does to us, making the need for elaboration unnecessary. 
Throughout the colonies but especially in Virginia, authorities 
had long limited the spread of disfavored religious ideas by re-
quiring licenses to preach, then granting those licenses only to 
favored religious groups or using them to limit religious  
activity.191 And indeed, at least one notable contemporary in  
Virginia specifically referred to those licenses as “claimable 
Priviledges,” which were often denied to dissenters on the basis 
of false pretenses or bare hostility.192 Read against that back-
ground, it seems plausible if not likely that Madison’s readers 
would have understood his argument in a similar way. An ex-
emption from the general assessment for Quakers and  
Mennonites might look like a reasonable accommodation. But in 
fact, it acted just like the licensing regimes of traditional estab-
lishments: it leveraged government power to grant special ad-
vantages to some kinds of religious messages over others, and by 
doing so, it increased government’s power over religious life 
more generally. 
Madison ultimately won the debate over Virginia’s General 
Assessment, though it is impossible to say what role his argu-
ment about the exemption played in the victory. Yet its connec-
tion to the controversy over preaching licenses suggests that, at 
the very least, Madison’s argument drew on more general  
 
 191 See McConnell, 44 Wm & Mary L Rev at 2163–66 (cited in note 150) (explaining 
this practice in Virginia and its impact on religious dissenters); id at 2119 (observing 
that as late as 1774, Baptist ministers in Virginia “were still being horsewhipped and 
jailed . . . for preaching without a license”). 
 192 Letter from Samuel Davies to Joseph Bellamy, The State of Religion among the 
Protestant Dissenters in Virginia (June 28, 1751), online at 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=evans;cc=evans;rgn=div1;view=text;idno= 
N05267.0001.001;node=N05267.0001.001:2 (visited Mar 16, 2019) (Perma archive  
unavailable) (recounting an instance in which a fellow minister’s request for certification 
was rejected “under Pretence” and contrasting this with the behavior of other officials 
who “always discovered a ready Disposition to allow us all claimable Priviledges”). See 
also Curry, First Freedoms at 99–100 (cited in note 151) (explaining Samuel Davies’s 
important role in challenging the licensing regime for ministers in Virginia). 
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arguments against religious establishments that were common 
by the time the Establishment Clause was adopted. Regardless 
of its precise impact, however, Madison’s argument offers a 
principle that can be extended beyond its specific historical con-
text: although accommodations generally have little connection 
to establishment, when an accommodation selectively subsidizes 
the government’s preferred religious messages, it ought to be 
considered a pretext for fostering government-induced religious 
conformity. 
Nonetheless, more still needs to be said. For although 
Madison’s argument offers an important insight, a second 
historical incident—this one following congressional debate over 
the Establishment Clause—offers a second significant example 
of how accommodations might be equated with religious 
establishments. 
2. The Uniform Militia Act. 
Leading up to the ratification of the Bill of Rights, Congress 
considered a religious exemption as part of what we now know 
as the Second Amendment. It guaranteed that “no person reli-
giously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms” and was es-
sentially identical to proposed language Madison had included 
in his draft bill of rights.193 The provision incited vigorous debate 
but ultimately failed to garner the necessary support.194 Com-
mentators have rightly concluded that “[t]here is no hint in this 
debate of any issue concerning establishment.”195 Yet they have 
quite remarkably ignored the fact that the issue resurfaced 
again a little over a year later during debates over the Uniform 
Militia Act. 
In its original form, the Uniform Militia Act created a gen-
eral requirement of militia service among eligible males, but it 
 
 193 1 Annals of Congress 778 (Aug 17, 1789). See also id at 451 (June 8, 1789) (“[N]o 
person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military ser-
vice in person.”). 
 194 Different members opposed the amendment for different reasons, but the pre-
dominant reason seems to have been the belief that such an exemption should be left to 
legislative discretion. For instance, Egbert Benson of New York argued that “the  
Legislature will always possess humanity enough to indulge this class of citizens in a 
matter they are so desirous of; but they ought to be left to their discretion.” Id at 780 
(Aug 17, 1789). Likewise, Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania suggested that the right to a 
militia exemption was “a legislative right altogether.” Id at 796 (Aug 20, 1789). See also 
McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1500–03 (cited in note 1) (summarizing the debate). 
 195 Laycock, 81 Notre Dame L Rev at 1810 (cited in note 150). 
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provided an exemption for certain classes of citizens if they paid 
two dollars to the United States in lieu of service. Such mone-
tary penalties were particularly worrisome to Quakers, who ap-
peared in person before Congress and asserted that such pay-
ments “manifestly infringe[d] on the rights of conscience.”196 
Some members of Congress agreed. For instance, Representative 
Aedanus Burke of South Carolina insisted that it was “not [ ] 
consonant with the principles of justice to make those conscien-
tiously scrupulous of bearing arms to pay for not acting against 
the voice of their conscience.”197 
 Others were not convinced. Most notably, Representative 
James Jackson, a hardened veteran of the Revolutionary War 
and one of the most prominent opponents of the original consti-
tutional exemption, contended that if exemptions without pay-
ment were given, “very few would be found, if their own word 
was to be taken, not conscientiously scrupulous.”198 And when 
the bill came before the full House for debate, Jackson continued 
by offering the following argument:  
[T]he operation of this privilege would be to make the whole 
community turn Quakers; and in this way it would establish 
the religion of that denomination more effectually than any 
positive law could any persuasion whatever.199 
Unlike earlier arguments opposing a constitutional exemp-
tion, which relied on claims about fairness or the role of the leg-
islature, Jackson’s argument here explicitly raised a concern 
about religious establishment. Moreover, given that the argu-
ment occurred after the Establishment Clause had been debated 
in Congress, it seems exceedingly likely that Jackson specifically 
intended to invoke it. According to Jackson, even if the purpose 
of the accommodation was to relieve Quakers of the burden in-
volved in either personal service or paying for a substitute, its 
“operation” would nonetheless create incentives toward religious 
conformity so overwhelming they ought to be considered an  
Establishment Clause violation. 
Jackson’s argument was met with skepticism. Madison as-
serted that “[h]e did not believe that the citizens of the United 
 
 196 Nicholas Waln, An Address and Memorial (1790), reprinted in David M. Gross, 
ed, American Quaker War Tax Resistance 221, 222 (Gross 2011). 
 197 2 Annals of Congress 1865 (Dec 21, 1790). 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id at 1869 (Dec 22, 1790). 
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States would hypocritically renounce their principles, their con-
science, and their God, for the sake of enjoying the exemp-
tion.”200 He also moved to insert a religious exemption for those 
refusing to bear arms and indicated he also supported exempt-
ing Quakers from payments.201 Jackson responded that Madison 
“had not argued with his usual ingenuity and knowledge of the 
human heart.”202 According to Jackson, “The influence of con-
science [was] a weak defence against the powerful temptations 
of pecuniary advantages,” and exempting Quakers from both mi-
litia service and monetary payment would render Quaker con-
verts “ten times as numerous” as they otherwise would be.203 
Proponents of the exemption did not reject Jackson’s prem-
ise that the incentives of an unqualified exemption might sound 
in religious establishment. Instead, they sought to answer  
Jackson by blunting the inducements toward religious  
conformity. For instance, one of the most outspoken supporters 
of the exemption, Representative Roger Sherman of Connecticut, 
agreed with Madison that many Quakers would never submit to 
a fine. Yet in an apparent attempt to address Jackson’s con-
cerns, Sherman cleverly suggested that perhaps Congress could 
“excus[e] part of the militia from a poll tax, so as to equalize the 
exemption.”204 Moreover, the following day, Madison himself of-
fered a revised proposal that provided an exemption for religious 
objectors who declared their sincerity before the civil magistrate, 
with the caveat that such objectors would “be liable to a penalty 
of ___ dollars, to be appropriated as the moneys arising from the 
post-office are appropriated.”205 By requiring a declaration as 
well as a monetary penalty, it seems clear that Madison’s pro-
posal aimed to address Jackson’s concern that citizens might 
feign Quakerism to benefit from an unqualified militia exemp-
tion. At the same time, by declaring that the money from the 
penalty “be appropriated as the moneys arising from the post-
office are appropriated,” Madison sought to alleviate Quaker 
concerns at least in part by ensuring that no money paid by ob-
jectors would be used to fund the militia.206 
 
 200 Id at 1872. 
 201 2 Annals of Congress 1871 (Dec 22, 1790). 
 202 Id at 1872. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. 
 205 2 Annals of Congress at 1874 (Dec 23, 1790). 
 206 Revenues generated from the post office were used to maintain the postal service 
and pay the relevant officials. See An Act for the Temporary Establishment of the  
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Ultimately, Congress elected to leave the matter of religious 
exemptions from militia service to the discretion of the states.207 
Nonetheless, the debate over the Uniform Militia Act is highly 
suggestive—it indicates that the Establishment Clause may well 
be implicated by accommodations that encourage religious con-
formity by offering incentives to adopt the accommodated reli-
gion. What is more, it also offers several clues as to how such a 
rule might function in practice. 
Consider first the question of the baseline against which in-
centives should be measured. In making the argument that an 
exemption without requiring payment could be analogized to a 
religious establishment, Jackson argued that the law would 
have the effect of inducing others to convert to Quakerism “more 
effectually than any positive law could any persuasion  
whatever.”208 As such, the argument was not simply that the ex-
emption provided a modest benefit to religious dissenters. In-
stead, Jackson’s argument turned on the fact that the combina-
tion of avoiding military service and avoiding payment created 
an incentive so powerful that it was indistinguishable from “pos-
itive law[s]” associated with establishments—laws that, in  
Justice Antonin Scalia’s words, were characterized by “coercion 
under threat of penalty.”209 Generalizing the point, we might 
conclude that the Establishment Clause should not be under-
stood as viewing every benefit accompanying an accommodation 
as raising constitutional concerns. Instead, the Establishment 
Clause is concerned only with accommodations whose likely  
effects on nonbeneficiaries are so pronounced that they are 
equivalent to coercive laws in their power to generate religious 
conformity. 
Second, the debate surrounding the Uniform Militia Act 
suggests that, when the concern over an accommodation 
involves incentivizing religious conformity, the appropriate 
remedy is often to dissipate the incentive. Although Jackson 
 
Post-Office, 1 Stat 70 (1789) (directing that regulations governing the post office be the 
same as they were under the Continental Congress); US Art of Confederation Art IX 
(declaring that postage on papers passing through the post offices be calibrated to 
“defray the expences of the said office”).  
 207 Id at 1875 (Dec 24, 1790). And indeed, a similar debate over militia exemptions 
for religious objectors had already been taking place in the states and continued contem-
poraneous with the debate in Congress. See Laycock, 81 Notre Dame L Rev at 1810–25 
(cited in note 150) (documenting the debate in Pennsylvania). 
 208 2 Annals of Congress 1869 (Dec 22, 1790). 
 209 Lee v Weisman, 505 US 577, 643 (1992) (Scalia dissenting). 
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believed that the incentives created by an unqualified militia 
exemption could be equated with religious establishment, he did 
not believe that this problem rendered any exemption 
unconstitutional. Instead, he argued that those who are 
exempted “ought to pay a full equivalent”—a solution that 
Jackson argued accorded with “every principle of justice and 
equity” and blunted the problem of incentives.210 
Commentators have overlooked the debate over the Uniform 
Militia Act when considering the relationship between religious 
accommodations and the Establishment Clause. But taken seri-
ously, it adds a second principle to the one identified in  
Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance: when an accommoda-
tion provides an exceedingly powerful incentive to adopt the  
religion being accommodated, it can rightly be analogized to a 
religious establishment. 
B. Modern Doctrine 
The arguments surrounding Virginia’s General Assessment 
and the Uniform Militia Act by themselves do not offer conclu-
sive proof of the Establishment Clause’s original public mean-
ing. But they are some of the most important instances—to my 
knowledge, the only instances—in which members of the  
Founding generation directly equated accommodations with re-
ligious establishments. Thus, if one is inclined to seek evidence 
of original meaning on the question of accommodation and  
establishment, these incidents are some of the most important 
evidence we possess.211 But that is not all. 
 
 210 2 Annals of Congress 1870 (Dec 22, 1790). 
 211 To be sure, some originalists will question my use of these historical sources on 
the ground that any limits imposed by the Establishment Clause originally applied only 
to the federal government, not state legislatures. See, for example, Steven D. Smith, The 
Jurisdictional Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 Notre Dame L Rev 1843, 1849–
50 (2006) (emphasizing this point); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and 
Reconstruction 34–45 (Yale 1998) (same); Elk Grove, 542 US at 50 (Thomas concurring) 
(arguing that “the Establishment Clause is best understood as a federalism provision—it 
protects state establishments from federal interference but does not protect any individ-
ual right”). Yet there several reasons to believe that my proposal is fully compatible with 
an original public meaning approach to the Establishment Clause. First, although the 
Founding generation very likely understood the Establishment Clause as applying only 
to the federal government, the historical evidence is clear that the clause was more than 
just a protection for state establishments. On the contrary, as Professor Donald  
Drakeman has persuasively shown, whatever else the clause accomplished, it provided a 
substantive limit: Congress could not establish a national religion or a national church. 
See Donald L. Drakeman, Church, State, and Original Intent 229–49 (Cambridge 2010). 
And the historical evidence—especially the debate in the first Congress over the Uniform 
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The Supreme Court has said that, although accommoda-
tions are generally permissible under the Establishment Clause, 
they must not “devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of religion.’”212 
But the Court has not been clear about how that line ought to be 
drawn. My claim is that the principles drawn from Madison’s 
and Jackson’s arguments offer attractive rules for implementing 
that limit and a more convincing way of reading the Court’s  
cases than an approach that foregrounds third-party harm. 
1. Selective subsidies for favored religious messages. 
Let’s begin with the principle, drawn from Madison’s  
Memorial and Remonstrance, that government may not foster 
religious conformity by using religious accommodations to selec-
tively subsidize its favored religious messages. Although the 
Court has not explicitly relied on Madison’s argument in its case 
law, that argument nonetheless provides an attractive principle 
for organizing several of the Court’s cases. 
In Texas Monthly, Inc v Bullock,213 for instance, the Supreme 
Court held that a law providing sales tax exemptions for religious 
publications violated the Establishment Clause.214 Writing for 
three members of the Court, Justice Brennan attempted to argue 
that the accommodation violated the Establishment Clause by 
“increasing the[ ] tax bills” of nonqualifying taxpayers in order 
to subsidize religious publications, thus “burden[ing] nonbenefi-
ciaries markedly.”215 Yet as even proponents of the third-party 
thesis concede, the idea that the exemption actually affected  
anyone’s tax bill is implausible in the extreme.216 What is more, 
as we have already observed, the Supreme Court has approved a 
multitude of religious accommodations that involve taxpayer 
 
Militia Act—suggests that this substantive limit included some constraints on religious 
accommodations. Moreover, even accepting that as an original matter the Establishment 
Clause applied only to the federal government, there is significant historical evidence 
suggesting that by the time of Reconstruction, the substantive constraints of the  
Establishment Clause were also assumed to be part of the “privileges or immunities” 
guaranteed to all citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kurt T. Lash, The Second 
Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 
Ariz St L J 1085, 1141–45 (1995) (making this argument). 
 212 Amos, 483 US at 334–35, quoting Hobbie v Unemployment Appeals Commission 
of Florida, 480 US 136, 145 (1987). 
 213 489 US 1 (1989). 
 214 Id at 5 (Brennan) (plurality). 
 215 Id at 15, 18–19 n 8 (Brennan) (plurality). 
 216 See Gedicks and Van Tassell, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 367–68 n 114 (cited in 
note 23). 
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dollars, many of which almost surely increase costs for a specific 
subset of individuals.217 
But Texas Monthly is eminently defensible on other 
grounds. Texas’s statute explicitly limited the sales tax exemp-
tion to “[p]eriodicals that are published or distributed by a reli-
gious faith and that consist wholly of writings promulgating the 
teaching of the faith.”218 That requirement undoubtedly impli-
cated core free speech principles insofar as it authorized gov-
ernment to discriminate between publications on the basis of 
content.219 But as Justice Harry Blackmun and Justice O’Connor 
correctly sensed but did not correctly explain, the law also 
worked a freestanding Establishment Clause harm.220 By apply-
ing the accommodation only to writings “promulgating the 
teaching of [a] faith,”221 the law granted an exemption based not 
on the existence of a religious burden but instead on the sub-
stance of a specific religious message. And structuring an ac-
commodation that way allows the government to use accommo-
dations to pick and choose the religious messages it favors. 
 
 217 See notes 139–41. See also Volokh, 46 UCLA L Rev at 1513–14 n 154 (cited in 
note 138). 
 218 Texas Monthly, 489 US at 5 (Brennan) (plurality), quoting Tex Tax Code Ann 
§ 151.312 (1982). 
 219 See id at 25–26 (White concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the sales tax 
exemption violated the Press Clause). 
 220 Justice Blackmun argued that the statute violated the Establishment Clause 
because it failed to include “philosophical literature distributed by nonreligious organi-
zations devoted to such matters of conscience as life and death, good and evil, being and 
nonbeing, right and wrong.” Id at 27–28 (Blackmun concurring in the judgment). But the 
Court has repeatedly held that it is perfectly permissible for accommodations to single 
out religion. See, for example, Amos, 483 US at 338 (declaring in reference to accommo-
dations that, “[w]here . . . government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation 
that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption 
comes packaged with benefits to secular entities”); Cutter, 544 US at 724 (reaffirming 
that view). To be sure, one might argue—as Justice Blackmun and Justice Brennan 
did—that the exemption in Texas Monthly was not actually an accommodation but in-
stead a generic subsidy that is constitutional only when it includes both religious and 
nonreligious beneficiaries. See, for example, Walz v Tax Commission of the City of New 
York, 397 US 664, 673 (1970) (holding that general tax exemptions for churches are con-
stitutional in part because they are “within a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, 
quasi-public corporations which include hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, pro-
fessional, historical, and patriotic groups” that the state considers “beneficial and stabi-
lizing influences in community life”). But that argument overlooks the fact that, unlike 
general tax exemptions, the exemption in Texas Monthly was designed to relieve a direct 
burden on religious practice—namely, taxing citizens for evangelistic activities that 
many understand to be a matter of religious obligation. 
 221 Texas Monthly, 489 US at 5 (Brennan) (plurality), quoting Tex Tax Code Ann 
§ 151.312 (1982). 
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To understand the point, imagine two different Catholic 
publications—one supporting the church’s teaching about an all-
male priesthood and another opposing it based on a competing 
view about the proper interpretation of Catholic doctrine. As a 
matter of course, Texas’s sales tax regime would place an identi-
cal burden on the religious practice associated with both publi-
cations—citizens would be taxed for engaging in what they be-
lieved to be proclamation of the true faith. But under the plain 
language of the exemption in Texas Monthly, there’s good reason 
to believe that only the first publication was actually eligible for 
the exemption: after all, that’s the publication promulgating the 
teaching of a faith.222 And even if one were to disagree on the 
facts of that example, it is clear that the statute’s design author-
ized the government to grant accommodations only when it 
judged a claimant to espouse the particular religious message 
described in the statute.223 The Court in Texas Monthly rightly 
concluded that an accommodation structured in that fashion is 
unconstitutional. It gives government the power to encourage 
conformity by channeling accommodations only to claimants es-
pousing its preferred religious ideas. 
To be sure, there is a difference between exemptions like the 
one at issue in Texas Monthly and the one that Madison con-
demned in his Memorial and Remonstrance. Unlike Virginia’s 
General Assessment, the Texas exemption selectively subsidized 
a generic religious message rather than the messages of particu-
lar Christian denominations. But that fact makes little differ-
ence. The reason is simple: although Madison’s argument arose 
in the context of an accommodation discriminating among 
Christian sects, his argument was not limited to that context. 
Madison objected to the exemption in the assessment not just 
because it offered Quakers and Mennonites preferential treat-
ment compared to other Christian denominations but because it 
served as a form of government-backed thought control—a 
 
 222 Texas Monthly, 489 US at 20 (Brennan) (plurality) (observing that the statute’s 
plain language “require[d] that public officials determine whether some message . . . is 
consistent with ‘the teaching of the faith’”). 
 223 The Texas Comptroller’s Office tried to assuage that concern by simply ignoring 
the statute’s requirement and creating a policy that allowed religious publishers to de-
termine for themselves whether their publication qualified for the exemption. See id at 
20–21 n 9. But as Justice Brennan correctly observed, that informal policy was both con-
trary to the statute’s plain text and subject to change at any time as a matter of adminis-
trative discretion. Id. 
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means “by which proselytes may be enticed.”224 And that logic 
applies with equal force to any accommodation that allows the 
government to skew the marketplace of religious ideas toward 
its preferred orthodoxy, even an orthodoxy not associated with 
any single denomination. 
Understanding Texas Monthly in light of Madison’s argu-
ment is also illuminating for another reason: it reconciles the 
case with wider free speech doctrine. In Rosenberger v Rector 
and Visitors of University of Virginia,225 the Supreme Court held 
that when the government offers subsidies for private speech on 
particular topics, it may not exclude religious speech on those 
same topics simply because the speech contains an evangelistic 
message.226 Critics of Rosenberger have argued that the decision 
is in tension with anti-establishment values because it sanc-
tioned the direct funding of private religious speech.227 But a  
correct reading of Texas Monthly suggests that, in cases involv-
ing private speech, the primary Establishment Clause concern is 
not “harm” to taxpayer conscience, much less funding for reli-
gion. Rather, the concern is with attempts to manipulate the 
public’s religious views to mirror the government’s own view. 
Reading Texas Monthly in light of Madison’s argument clarifies 
that—in both accommodation cases and funding cases involving 
private speech—it is government-induced conformity, not paying 
for religion, that the Establishment Clause aims to prevent. 
Consistent with Madison’s argument in the Memorial and 
Remonstrance, then, Texas Monthly stands for the proposition 
that the Establishment Clause condemns accommodations that 
provide selective subsidies for a preferred religious message. But 
the principle also extends to other kinds of efforts on the part of 
government to enhance the religious messages it favors. Here, 
the important example involves the Court’s rulings in some of 
its first accommodation cases about release-time programs in 
public schools. 
 
 224 Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance at 57 (cited in note 79). 
 225 515 US 819 (1995). 
 226 Id at 842–46. 
 227 See id at 868 (Souter dissenting) (arguing that the Establishment Clause 
prohibits “[u]sing public funds for the direct subsidization of preaching the word”). See 
also, for example, Tebbe, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age at 189 (cited in note 
23) (arguing that “commitments to . . . nonestablishment” were a valid reason for 
denying funding in Rosenberger). 
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In McCollum v Board of Education,228 the Court struck down 
an accommodation that would have allowed public school stu-
dents to be released from class to receive religious instruction on 
school grounds.229 Although the instruction was voluntary and 
required parental consent, the Court nonetheless held that the 
program violated the Establishment Clause.230 But just a few 
years later in Zorach v Clauson,231 the Court upheld a similar  
release-time program in which the religious instruction took 
place off school grounds.232 
The reasoning in these cases is opaque. In McCollum, the 
majority suggested that use of the state’s “tax-established and 
tax-supported public school system” rendered the program un-
constitutional.233 But that argument—like the plurality’s argu-
ment in Texas Monthly—relies on unpersuasive claims about 
taxpayer harm. Other justices suggested that the key element in 
the cases involved the harm that release-time programs caused 
nonparticipating students.234 But that claim also seems over-
drawn, at least as a doctrinal matter. Providing students with 
an hour of study hall while some of their peers engage in reli-
gious instruction does not seem like a constitutionally signifi-
cant imposition—especially because the religious students un-
doubtedly still had to complete all the same assignments as 
their peers. 
Here too, Madison’s argument against selective subsidies for 
favored religious messages provides the most convincing ra-
tionale for the Court’s decisions. As Justice Brennan later ob-
served, the Court’s attempt to explain McCollum by reference to 
public expenditures was wholly unconvincing—using “class-
rooms, heat and light and time” simply does not add any real 
cost for anyone nor would such a cost even be relevant.235 In-
stead, what distinguished the release-time program in 
McCollum from the program in Zorach was the fact that the 
former “len[t] . . . sectarian instruction all the authority of the 
 
 228 333 US 203 (1948). 
 229 Id at 211–12. 
 230 Id at 207–08. 
 231 343 US 306 (1952). 
 232 Id at 315. 
 233 McCollum, 333 US at 210. 
 234 See, for example, Zorach, 343 US at 324 (Jackson dissenting) (arguing that the 
release-time program “serve[d] as a temporary jail for a pupil who will not go to 
Church”). 
 235 Schempp, 374 US at 261 (Brennan concurring). 
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governmentally operated public school system”236 while giving 
school officials unbridled discretion to deny those benefits to dis-
favored religious messages. By holding the release-time program 
in the regular public school classrooms, the McCollum program 
effectively underwrote the authority of religious teachers by 
“plac[ing] [them] . . . in precisely the position of authority held 
by the regular teachers of secular subjects.”237 But even more 
importantly, it left the decision about which religious groups 
could participate solely to the school superintendent, who would 
“determine whether or not it [was] practical for said group to 
teach in said school system.”238 By contrast, the program in  
Zorach allowed any “duly constituted religious body” to conduct 
offsite instruction, and prohibited all school officials from “com-
ment[ing] . . . on attendance or nonattendance of any pupil.”239 
Madison’s argument in the Memorial and Remonstrance dealt 
only with monetary subsidies. But the insight of the Court’s  
release-time cases is that the Establishment Clause also  
prohibits accommodations that grant the government unfettered 
discretion to use its “prestige and capacity for influence”240 to 
promote some religious ideas over others. 
In sum, although the Court’s precedents have not always 
been clear in explaining the point, modern Establishment 
Clause doctrine echoes Madison’s argument in the Memorial 
and Remonstrance. Although accommodations are generally 
permissible, the Establishment Clause prohibits accommoda-
tions that foster religious conformity by selectively subsidizing 
the government’s preferred religious messages. But that is not 
all. The Court’s precedents—like Jackson’s argument about the 
militia accommodation—also suggest a second limit focused on 
incentives. 
2. Incentives to adopt the accommodated religion. 
The second principle, drawn from Jackson’s argument about 
the Uniform Militia Act, suggests that the Establishment Clause 
limits accommodations that create exceedingly powerful 
 
 236 Id at 263 (Brennan concurring). 
 237 Id at 262 (Brennan concurring). 
 238 McCollum, 333 US at 208 n 3. 
 239 Zorach, 343 US at 308 n 1. 
 240 Schempp, 374 US at 263 (Brennan concurring). 
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incentives to adopt the accommodated religion.241 Like Madison’s 
argument, this limiting principle has not always been clearly 
articulated by the Court. Nonetheless, it illuminates several 
other cases setting limits on religious accommodations, 
including some invoked by supporters of the third-party thesis. 
To unpack the point, let’s return to the Supreme Court’s 
famous Draft Cases, which involved exemptions from combat 
service during the Vietnam War. In United States v Seeger,242 
the Court considered an Establishment Clause challenge to the 
Selective Service Act.243 The Act allowed individuals “conscien-
tiously opposed to participation in war in any form” to obtain an 
exemption, provided their objection was based on “religious 
training and belief.”244 The law further defined “religious belief” 
as a belief concerning “a Supreme Being involving duties  
superior to those arising from any human relation” rather than 
“essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views.”245 
Daniel Seeger applied for an exemption but was denied after 
stating that his objection was based on “a religious faith in a 
purely ethical creed.”246 The Supreme Court reversed. The Court 
reasoned that the law’s reference to beliefs involving a “Supreme 
Being” should be interpreted broadly to include any belief that 
“occup[ies] the same place in the life of the objector as an ortho-
dox belief in God.”247 According to the Court, because Seeger’s 
beliefs occupied a “parallel position[ ]” to beliefs associated with 
traditional religion, he was eligible for the exemption.248 
Just a few years later in Welsh v United States,249 the Court 
widened its reading of the Selective Service Act even further. 
Like Seeger, Elliott Welsh maintained that he was agnostic as to 
the existence of God. Unlike Seeger, however, Welsh emphatically 
rejected the characterization of his beliefs as “religious.” Instead, 
he claimed that his opposition to war stemmed from a belief that 
 
 241 This principle shares much in common with a view of the Religion Clauses 
focused on “substantive neutrality.” See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and 
Disaggregated Neutrality toward Religion, 39 DePaul L Rev 993, 1017 (1990) (exploring 
the problem of incentives in relation to military service); Laycock, 81 Notre Dame L Rev 
at 1808 (cited in note 150) (same). 
 242 380 US 163 (1965). 
 243 62 Stat 604 (1948), codified at 50 USC § 3801 et seq.  
 244 Seeger, 380 US at 165, citing 50 USC App § 456(j) (1958). 
 245 Seeger, 380 US at 165, quoting 50 USC App § 456(j) (1958). 
 246 Id at 166. 
 247 Id at 184. 
 248 Id at 166. 
 249 398 US 333 (1970) (Black) (plurality). 
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“human life is valuable in and of itself.”250 The Supreme Court 
nonetheless held that Welsh was also entitled to the exemption. 
Glossing over the statute’s explicit refusal to grant exemptions 
based on “political, sociological, or philosophical views,” a plural-
ity of the Supreme Court held that the statute mandated an ex-
emption for any opposition to war arising from “deeply held 
moral, ethical, or religious beliefs.”251 
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the reasoning in 
Seeger and Welsh is exceedingly dubious. Accordingly, many 
commentators view these cases as rooted in the Establishment 
Clause. Yet if that is so, what kind of Establishment Clause rule 
did the Draft Cases actually announce? One possibility might be 
that the Establishment Clause forbids singling out “religion” for 
accommodation, rather than also accommodating all equivalent 
moral or philosophical convictions.252 But that explanation is 
improbable. For one thing, only Justice John Marshall Harlan 
adopted anything like this view.253 But even more importantly, 
that interpretation stands at odds with the Court’s repeated 
insistence that a religious accommodation need not “come 
packaged with benefits to secular entities” to comply with the 
Establishment Clause.254 
Jackson’s argument about incentives provides a much more 
plausible explanation. By denying an exemption from combat 
service to everyone but religious pacifists, the Selective Service 
Act clearly created an inducement to adopt the required religion. 
First, the nature of the material benefit—avoiding the perils of 
war and maintaining basic bodily security—is itself an objectively 
powerful inducement. And given that the stigma surrounding 
pacifism has decreased from the Founding era to today, it seems 
reasonable to view that inducement as equivalent to a coercive 
law, even absent an accompanying monetary incentive.255  
 
 250 Id at 343 (Black) (plurality). 
 251 Id at 344 (Black) (plurality). 
 252 See Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U Chi L Rev 1351, 
1367 n 62, 1417–18 (2012) (arguing in favor of this interpretation); William P. Marshall, 
The Case against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 Case W 
Res L Rev 357, 396 n 189 (1989) (same). For an interesting and sophisticated theory  
defending this approach to the Religion Clauses generally, see Christopher L. Eisgruber 
and Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution 112–18 (Harvard 2007). 
 253 See Welsh, 398 US at 356–61 (Harlan concurring). 
 254 Amos, 483 US at 338. See also Cutter, 544 US at 724. 
 255 Compare Philip A. Hamburger, Religious Freedom in Philadelphia, 54 Emory L J 
1603, 1609 (2005) (observing that during the Founding period “Quakers, Mennonites, 
and other pacifists found themselves at the mercy of resentful mobs . . . who occasionally 
924 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:871 
 
Moreover, like the Founding-era exemption, the exemption in 
the Selective Service Act involved deep claims of conscience 
about particular topics—unjust killing and participation in war 
generally—that members of the first Congress recognized as 
deeply powerful in their own day and that we recognize as simi-
larly powerful in ours.256 Finally, the Court chose to solve the 
problem by applying exactly the remedy Jackson and others 
suggested—namely, dissipating the incentive toward religious 
conformity, in this case by widening the exemption. The reason-
ing in the Draft Cases is obscure. But read in the most persua-
sive way possible, they echo Jackson’s theory exactly: when an 
accommodation provides exceptionally powerful incentives to 
adopt the religion being accommodated, the Establishment 
Clause demands that it be modified to dispel the inducement. 
To be sure, the Draft Cases might seem a fragile basis for 
suggesting that modern Establishment Clause doctrine limits 
accommodations that provide exceptionally powerful incentives 
to adopt a religion. But many parts of the law consistently take 
this same shape, expanding accommodations that involve a simi-
lar combination of strong material incentives and weighty mat-
ters of conscience. For example, the law protects employees in 
state and federal prisons from disciplinary action for refusing to 
engage in virtually any form of participation in the death  
penalty that is “contrary to th[eir] moral or religious convic-
tions.”257 Similar protections exist for health care providers 
whose “religious beliefs or moral convictions” prohibit them from 
performing sterilizations or abortions.258 Likewise, all six states 
 
educated their fellow Americans as to the cost of ignoring their civic duties”), with Bill 
Zimmerman, The Four Stages of the Antiwar Movement (NY Times, Oct 24, 2017), online 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/opinion/vietnam-antiwar-movement.html (visited 
Mar 26, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable) (noting that by 1967, a protest against the 
war in Vietnam attracted no fewer than 500,000 people, and “[s]elf-interested draft 
avoidance evolved into morally driven draft resistance”). 
 256 For example, Representative Roger Sherman observed that “persons conscien-
tiously scrupulous of bearing arms could not be compelled to do it; for such persons will 
rather suffer death than commit moral evil.” 2 Annals of Congress 1872 (Dec 22, 1790). 
 257 18 USC § 3597(b) (providing that “[n]o employee . . . shall be required . . . to be in 
attendance at or to participate in any prosecution or execution under this section if such 
participation is contrary to the moral or religious convictions of the employee,” and speci-
fying that “participation” includes “personal preparation of the condemned individual 
and the apparatus used for execution and supervision of the activities of other personnel 
in carrying out such activities”). See also Mark L. Rienzi, The Constitutional Right Not to 
Kill, 62 Emory L J 121, 139–42 (2012) (discussing this provision and similar state laws). 
 258 42 USC § 300a-7(b) (also known as the “Church Amendment”). Similarly, the  
Affordable Care Act prohibits the government from discriminating in its qualified health 
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that currently permit physician-assisted suicide provide protec-
tion for physicians who refuse to participate, whether their ob-
jections are religious or not.259 And those examples again mirror 
the draft example: they involve an objectively powerful incen-
tive—here, losing one’s job—and also claims of conscience that 
are both deeply powerful and widely held. And although the 
connection to the Establishment Clause is only implicit, the fact 
that the law already avoids inducements toward religious con-
formity in instances like these is highly suggestive. 
But how far does the principle extend? After all, read in a 
less nuanced way, Jackson’s concern with the Quaker exemption 
could be seen as focused not on things like bodily security or the 
moral weightiness of war but instead only on the “pecuniary ad-
vantages” that would result from excusing Quakers from paying 
for a substitute.260 And indeed, in response to the Court’s deci-
sion in Hobby Lobby, several commentators raised a similar con-
cern, claiming that the “financial incentive” to avoid regulation 
created by the Court’s decision would encourage many corpora-
tions to become religious in order to avoid various costs.261 
Undoubtedly, the worry over financial incentives is appro-
priate. After all, massive economic incentives can certainly be a 
potentially potent tool in fostering conformity. Yet there are also 
 
plans against “any individual health care provider or health care facility because of its 
unwillingness to provide, pay for, provide coverage of, or refer for abortions.” 42 USC 
§ 18023(b)(4). See also 42 USC § 18023(c)(2)(A) (expressly stating that nothing in the 
Affordable Care Act shall be construed to have any effect on federal laws regarding  
conscience protection and “willingness or refusal to provide abortion”). 
 259 See Cal Health & Safety Code § 443.14(e)(1)–(2) (providing a right not to partici-
pate in physician-assisted suicide to “a person or entity that elects, for reasons of con-
science, morality, or ethics,” including a right to refuse to inform patients of the practice 
or refer them to physicians who engage in it); Colo Rev Stat Ann § 25-48-117(1)–(2) 
(providing that, when a health care provider is “unable or unwilling to carry out an indi-
vidual’s request for medical aid-in-dying,” she may refuse); Hawaii Rev Stat § 327L-
19(a)(4) (providing that no health care provider or facility “shall be under any duty, 
whether by contract, statute, or any other legal requirement” to provide medication to 
end a patient’s life); Or Rev Stat Ann § 127.885 (same); 18 Vt Stat Ann § 5285(a)–(b) 
(providing that no person shall be “under any duty . . . to participate in the provision of a 
lethal dose of medication,” nor can they be disciplined by any health care facility or pro-
vider for refusal to do so); Wash Rev Code Ann § 70.245.190(b), (d) (providing that “[o]nly 
willing health care providers shall participate in the provision to a qualified patient of 
medication to end his or her life” and providing various other protections). 
 260 2 Annals of Congress 1872 (Dec 22, 1790).  
 261 Marshall, 2014 S Ct Rev at 120 (cited in note 4). See also Leslie C. Griffin, Hobby 
Lobby: The Crafty Case That Threatens Women’s Rights and Religious Freedom, 42 
Hastings Const L Q 641, 674 (2015) (arguing that “Hobby Lobby open[ed] the door for 
corporate RFRA claims, thus expanding the possibilities for religious exemptions in 
corporate America”). 
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good reasons to approach arguments focused exclusively on fi-
nancial incentives with care. For one thing, it is easy to overes-
timate the influence that supposed monetary benefits will exert 
over potential claimants. Contrary to the fears expressed after 
Hobby Lobby, there is now mounting empirical evidence that the 
Court’s ruling did not actually produce the tidal wave of follow-
on religious liberty claims that critics predicted.262 Indeed, there 
is even evidence that, in the months and years following Hobby 
Lobby, the number of religious liberty cases being brought actu-
ally declined.263 If strong financial incentives to challenge wide 
swaths of regulation were actually created by the Hobby Lobby 
ruling, one would expect to see different results. 
There is also a subtler point here. Financial incentives can 
appear powerful, especially when considered in isolation. But 
that perspective can obscure the ways that those incentives, 
even significant ones, are frequently overshadowed by other con-
cerns. Seeking a religious exemption from employment regula-
tions or other laws might offer modest cost-savings in theory. 
But it also risks alienating one’s workforce, sparking public con-
troversy, and weathering robust inquiries into the sincerity of 
one’s beliefs. Moreover, unlike the draft example, in these cases 
there is no temptation to feign religion to avoid what might 
seem to be an even more egregious moral wrong. On the contrary, 
in cases involving only financial incentives, concerns about con-
science cut decidedly the other way. And given all of that, the 
relative paucity of corporate religious liberty litigation after 
Hobby Lobby is unsurprising. When the social and moral costs of 
seeking a religious accommodation are high—as they almost al-
ways are—the idea that financial incentives alone will be suffi-
cient to raise Establishment Clause worries can be overdrawn.264 
 
 262 See Goodrich and Busick, 48 Seton Hall L Rev at 356, 384 (cited in note 10) 
(documenting RFRA claims in the Tenth Circuit and concluding that such cases “remain 
scarce” and that there were no new RFRA challenges “by any for-profit corporations—or 
any organization for that matter” thirty-two months after Hobby Lobby); Barclay and 
Rienzi, 59 BC L Rev at 1642 (cited in note 10) (noting that an empirical assessment of 
the federal caseload shows that religious freedom claims have remained “fairly 
constant”). 
 263 See Barclay and Rienzi, 59 BC L Rev at 1643 (cited in note 10) (documenting a 
decline in religious liberty cases as a percentage of the reported federal cases following 
Hobby Lobby). 
 264 See Nathan S. Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 Wash L Rev 1185, 
1232–33 (2017) (noting “the costs—financial, emotional, and otherwise—entailed in . . . 
seek[ing] a religious accommodation,” and observing that “[t]he specter of litigation alone 
could deter the fainthearted, much less the false”). In this sense at least, Madison may 
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A more promising approach would focus less on money and 
more on situations in which government has powerful tools to 
encourage conformity by exerting significant control over day-to-
day life. And indeed, courts have already recognized as much in 
contexts like prisons. In Cutter, the Supreme Court noted that, 
although religious accommodations for prisoners are generally 
constitutional under the Establishment Clause, there is none-
theless cause for concern when “the opportunity to assemble in 
[prison] worship services, might attract joiners seeking a break 
in their closely guarded day.”265 Accordingly, lower courts have 
sometimes augmented religious accommodations to allow athe-
ists or secular humanists to form clubs on similar terms with re-
ligious groups.266 Likewise, courts have also extended Cutter’s 
observation to other contexts by concluding that the  
Establishment Clause requires prison officials to refrain from 
attaching valuable benefits, such as early release or “good time” 
credits, to participation in religious treatment programs, at least 
when a secular alternative is unavailable.267 
But what about instances in which the Court has held an 
accommodation is permissible or even required despite the fact 
that it could be seen as creating incentives for religious practice? 
In Amos, for instance, the Court unanimously upheld Title VII’s 
exemption allowing religious organizations to hire only members 
of their own religion despite the fact that it might entice present 
or future employees to comply with a church’s teachings.268 
Likewise, one might suggest that the ministerial exception at  
issue in Hosanna-Tabor incentivizes religious leaders to behave 
according to their church’s beliefs.269 Why, then, doesn’t the  
Establishment Clause prohibit it? 
The answer, quite simply, is that Amos and Hosanna-Tabor 
do not stand at odds with the concern over religious incentives. 
 
have had the better of the argument over the Quaker exemption. See 2 Annals of Cong 
1872 (Dec 22, 1790) (silently accepting Jackson’s proposed connection between religious 
establishment and induced conformity, but arguing that citizens would not “renounce 
their principles, their conscience, and their God” for the sake of modest monetary  
advantages). 
 265 Cutter, 544 US at 721 n 10. 
 266 See, for example, Kaufman v McCaughtry, 419 F3d 678, 683–84 (7th Cir 2005). 
 267 See generally, for example, Griffin v Coughlin, 673 NE2d 98 (NY 1996) (family 
visitation); Kerr v Farrey, 95 F3d 472 (7th Cir 1996) (consideration for parole); Munson v 
Norris, 435 F3d 877, 880–81 (8th Cir 2006) (extra work detail); Warner v Orange County 
Department of Probation, 115 F3d 1068 (2d Cir 1996) (probation). 
 268 Amos, 483 US at 339–40. 
 269 See generally Hosanna-Tabor, 565 US 171 (2012). 
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On the contrary, they validate it. But they do so by relating that 
concern to larger worries over government-induced religious  
conformity. 
To understand the point, the best place to begin is Amos. It 
is true that allowing religious organizations to discriminate in 
their hiring might occasionally result in an inducement for a po-
tential employee to adopt or feign a religion. But unlike exemp-
tions from the draft or similar examples, the inducement is not 
triggered by government action. Rather, as the Court in Amos 
correctly observed, the decision to leave religious organizations 
with discretion about whom to hire and fire simply removes gov-
ernment control—any subsequent incentive is the result of con-
tingent action by a private group, not action by the govern-
ment.270 But even if one disagrees, there is also a deeper insight 
here. Situations like those in Amos present a choice: either allow 
legislatures to exempt religious organizations knowing that do-
ing so might unintentionally alter the choices of a few  
employees, or face a regime in which all religious groups must 
repeatedly litigate which of their positions are “religious” and 
which are not.271 And not surprisingly, when faced with that 
choice, every single justice in Amos opted to uphold the exemp-
tion. That approach is the one less likely to foster control over 
religious practice and the one that actually reduces governmen-
tal incentives to conform in the mine run of cases. 
The argument is even stronger when one considers Hosanna- 
Tabor, which held that the Religion Clauses prohibit courts from 
entertaining certain kinds of employment lawsuits involving a 
religious organization and its leaders. As in Amos, there was a 
sense in which that approach might create an incentive insofar 
as it put clergy on notice that failure to adhere to their church’s 
doctrine might lead to termination without legal recourse. But 
again, that incentive is not of the government’s own making: a 
church’s decision about whom to retain as its minister is one of 
the clearest examples of private action one could imagine. More-
over, the worry that the ministerial exception might incentivize 
religious leaders to comply with their church’s teaching—if that 
 
 270 Amos, 483 US at 337 & n 15 (observing that the employee in the case had his 
“freedom of choice in religious matters . . . impinged upon,” but that “it was the Church 
. . . not the Government” who exerted that pressure by terminating him from his job). 
 271 As Justice Brennan observed, that regime would “chill[ ] religious activity” by 
inducing religious groups to organize themselves in ways that minimize their litigation 
risk rather than maximize their faith. Amos, 483 US at 345 (Brennan concurring). 
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even counts as a worry272—pales in comparison to the risks asso-
ciated with giving government the power to effectively select a 
church’s ministers. Church autonomy decisions like those in 
Amos and Hosanna-Tabor further the Establishment Clause 
concern over incentives by providing more latitude for religious 
choice, not less. 
Policing accommodations that create powerful incentives is 
an important part of the Establishment Clause. But it is also 
part of a much broader goal: preventing government from decid-
ing what kind of religion the populace will or will not practice. It 
is that evil, above all others, that the Establishment Clause is 
intended to prevent. 
IV.  RECONSIDERING HARM 
At this point, it is worth briefly recapitulating the argument 
as it stands so far. 
First, I have argued that, although the third-party thesis is 
relatively popular among academics and perhaps even gaining 
ground among a few members of the Supreme Court, there are 
good reasons to believe it fails as an interpretation of the  
Establishment Clause. Its analogy between accommodations 
that inadvertently generate costs and church taxes is both his-
torically and conceptually weak, and the thesis is foreclosed by 
many of the Court’s precedents. 
Second, I have argued that, when evaluating religious ac-
commodations under the Establishment Clause, the fundamen-
tal inquiry ought to be whether the government is using its 
power to foster religious conformity. Under that principle, the 
Establishment Clause prohibits accommodations that selectively 
favor the government’s preferred religious messages as well as 
accommodations that provide exceedingly powerful incentives to 
adopt the religion being accommodated. Those limits provide 
satisfying explanations for many of the Supreme Court’s prece-
dents, and they ground Establishment Clause analysis in an  
 
 272 See Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of  
Hosanna-Tabor, 108 Nw U L Rev 1183, 1194 (2014): 
When one joins a church, one accepts the religious choices made by the church. 
People can leave or stay. But so long as they choose to stay, they accept how 
the church handles its religious affairs. Dissenters cannot use the coercive 
force of the government to compel a change in the church’s religious views, 
practices, or governance. 
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approach that is more historically and doctrinally plausible than 
one that emphasizes third-party harm. 
But my position is open to some significant objections. Most 
importantly, some readers will surely worry that my view of the 
Establishment Clause is too narrow and perhaps even danger-
ously so. If the Establishment Clause is fundamentally a prohi-
bition on government-induced conformity, what are we to do 
with accommodations that threaten other interests in important 
ways? To take just one obvious example, what about an accom-
modation from homicide laws for a religious group that engages 
in ritual killings? Such a law seems unlikely to induce others 
toward religion. But if the Establishment Clause is best read as 
a ban on attempts to induce religious conformity, does that 
mean the Constitution has nothing to say about this fanciful 
law—and others like it—when the harms are striking? 
These concerns are real. But more than that, I think that, 
as a matter of substance, they are well founded. There are and 
should be limits on laws that harm others, and religious 
accommodations are no exception. But objections like these 
tacitly assume that an Establishment Clause principle focused 
squarely on third-party harm is the only possible source of those 
limits. That assumption is false. Indeed, as this Part explains, 
viewing the Establishment Clause as a ban on government-
induced conformity does not mean ignoring the costs of 
accommodation. On the contrary, it actually provides a more 
plausible way of thinking about such costs and the various ways 
that the law limits them. This Part explains that insight first in 
relation to the Establishment Clause and goes on to discuss 
other limits on religious accommodation. 
A. The Establishment Clause 
To begin, let’s return to the most basic point. Although  
accommodations are generally permissible under the  
Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court has said they must 
not “devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of religion.’”273 As we 
have seen, that rule is clearly violated when accommodations 
provide unfair advantages for the government’s favored religious 
ideas or create powerful incentives to engage in religious prac-
tice. But there are also subtler forms of manipulation. Most ob-
viously, government may unlawfully foster religious conformity 
 
 273 Cutter, 544 US at 714, quoting Amos, 483 US at 334–35. 
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by using accommodation as a pretext to reward those who have 
already chosen to conform. 
Recall that as a historical matter, religious accommodations 
have always been coextensive with disestablishment: they re-
move government power over private religious practice and 
thereby serve the larger goal of preserving religious freedom. 
But it is important to remember that not all exceptions for reli-
gion fell into that category. In medieval England, “benefit of 
clergy” exemptions allowed leaders of the established church to 
avoid prosecution in civil courts for serious crimes, including 
murder and rape.274 In colonial New York and elsewhere, the es-
tablished church possessed special legal privileges allowing it to 
hold property while other churches could not.275 In Virginia, min-
isters of the Church of England who wished to conduct  
marriages were exempted from licensing requirements that ap-
plied to all other groups,276 and so on. 
The point here is a simple one: there is an important differ-
ence between exemptions protecting religious freedom and ex-
emptions designed to favor or reward religious people of one sort 
or another. Genuine accommodations are aimed at alleviating 
burdens on religious practice and thus are part of the broader 
project of ensuring religious liberty for all. But some exemptions 
serve the opposite function—they grant privileges or benefits not 
to relieve a burden but instead simply to reward the govern-
ment’s preferred form of religiosity. And as the Court’s modern 
cases suggest, one important factor in distinguishing these kinds 
of laws from constitutionally permissible accommodations in-
volves their redistributive effects. 
To see what I mean, let’s return to Caldor, the case most 
often invoked by supporters of the third-party thesis. There, the 
Supreme Court considered an Establishment Clause challenge 
to a Connecticut law guaranteeing that no person could be 
required to work on a day designated as his Sabbath.277 Donald 
Thornton, a manager at a department store, sought an 
accommodation under the statute after his employer began 
 
 274 See Berg, 38 Harv J L & Gender at 144–47 (cited in note 77) (describing these laws). 
 275 See Mark D. McGarvie, Disestablishing Religion and Protecting Religious Liberty 
in State Laws and Constitutions (1776–1833), in T. Jeremy Gunn and John Witte Jr, eds, 
No Establishment of Religion: America’s Original Contribution to Religious Liberty 70, 
90–91 (Oxford 2012) (describing these laws). 
 276 See McConnell, 44 Wm & Mary L Rev at 2175–76 (cited in note 150) (explaining 
licensing regimes for conducting marriages). 
 277 472 US at 706. 
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opening its stores on Sunday. His employer argued that the 
accommodation violated the Establishment Clause, and the 
Supreme Court agreed.278 
Supporters of the third-party thesis focus on Chief Justice 
Burger’s observation about the “significant burdens” the law 
placed on employers and employees as the dispositive feature of 
the case.279 But as we have already seen, the Court has  
repeatedly blessed accommodations that generate costs for oth-
ers.280 Moreover, a focus on harm alone is also a poor fit on  
Caldor’s own facts. Prior to the Sabbath law, Thornton’s em-
ployer had already adopted an internal policy that granted al-
most all of its employees the right to refrain from Sunday work 
if such work was “contrary [to the employee’s] personal religious 
convictions.”281 Admittedly, Thornton was a manager, not a ge-
neric employee. But there was no evidence that alternatives like 
finding a substitute had even been tried, much less found want-
ing. Harm alone is not a sufficient basis to explain the decision. 
Now consider the case in a more holistic way. The law at  
issue in Caldor provided a day off for anyone “who state[d] that 
a particular day of the week is observed as his Sabbath.”282 By 
its terms, that command extended beyond relieving a burden on 
religious practice. By providing a day off for anyone who stated 
that a particular day “is observed” as his Sabbath, the statute 
also appeared to mandate a full day’s absence even when the 
relevant religious need involved nothing more than attending a 
worship service lasting a few minutes.283 But what is more, the 
 
 278 Id at 710–11. 
 279 Id at 710. See, for example, Gedicks and Koppelman, 67 Vand L Rev En Banc at 
54 (cited in note 114). They also point to Chief Justice Burger’s statement—taken from 
Judge Learned Hand—that “[t]he First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist 
that in pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his own reli-
gious necessities.” Caldor, 472 US at 710, quoting Otten v Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 
Co, 205 F2d 58, 61 (2d Cir 1953). See also Tebbe, Religion in an Egalitarian Age at 55 
(cited in note 23); Gedicks and Van Tassell, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 358 (cited in note 
23) (same). Yet as others have rightly observed, reading that statement in context casts 
doubt on the idea it was meant to express concern over generic third-party harm. See, for 
example, Sepinwall, 82 U Chi L Rev at 1968–69 n 259 (cited in note 4) (explaining that 
the statement originally stood for the idea that “one cannot claim First Amendment pro-
tections against nonstate actors” and was used by Chief Justice Burger to emphasize the 
law’s “formal favoring of religious interests,” not its impact on third-parties). 
 280 See notes 114–41 and accompanying text. 
 281 Caldor, 472 US at 706 n 4. 
 282 Id at 708, quoting Conn Gen Stat § 53-303e(b). 
 283 See id at 709 (characterizing the law as “arm[ing] Sabbath observers with an ab-
solute and unqualified right not to work on whatever day they designate as their  
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law required private parties to take affirmative steps to relieve 
that nonexistent burden even when the costs of doing so were 
exceedingly high.284 The majority in Caldor concluded that  
Connecticut’s Sabbath law amounted to an “unyielding 
weighting in favor of Sabbath observers,”285 not because it inci-
dentally harmed third-parties but because it provided an unjus-
tified reward for some religious claimants with no regard for the 
costs that requirement might impose.286 
A similar logic explains much of the Court’s language in 
Cutter, the other case most frequently cited by supporters of the 
third-party thesis. In Cutter, the Court upheld RLUIPA, a gen-
eral accommodation statute that allows prisoners to seek case-
by-case religious accommodations for things like kosher food or 
religious dress. In so holding, the Court observed that RLUIPA 
requires courts to “take adequate account of the burdens a re-
quested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.”287 
More specifically, the Court noted that the burden-shifting  
analysis mandated by RLUIPA’s text indicated that it would not 
“elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institu-
tion’s need to maintain order and safety.”288 Concluding its opin-
ion, however, the Court cautioned that, “[s]hould inmate re-
quests for religious accommodations . . . impose unjustified 
burdens on other[s],” prisons would be right to resist them.289 
 
Sabbath”). See also Kent Greenawalt, 2 Religion and the Constitution: Establishment 
and Fairness 344–45 (Princeton 2008) (observing that the law in Caldor “gave workers 
their Sabbath off from work whether or not they objected in principle to working on their 
Sabbath, and could or could not combine worship and work on the same day”). 
 284 See Caldor, 472 US at 709 (suggesting that the law “command[ed] that Sabbath 
religious concerns automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace” irre-
spective of “the convenience or interests of the employer or those of other employees”). 
See also Amos, 483 US at 337–38 & n 15 (suggesting that the statute in Caldor had  
“given the force of law to the employee’s designation of a Sabbath day and required ac-
commodation by the employer regardless of the burden which that constituted for the 
employer or other employees”). 
 285 Caldor, 472 US at 710. 
 286 Admittedly, the Court in Caldor was probably wrong to strike down the Sabbath 
law rather than dealing with the concern about gratuitous burden-shifting in an as-
applied challenge. But that error was part of the Court’s larger failure to distinguish be-
tween facial and as-applied challenges in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence—a 
problem it has since remedied. See Bowen v Kendrick, 487 US 589, 602 (1988) (acknowl-
edging the appropriateness of distinguishing between facial and as-applied challenges 
under the Establishment Clause). 
 287 Cutter, 544 US at 720. 
 288 Id at 722. 
 289 Id at 726. 
934 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:871 
 
Proponents of the third-party thesis point to this discussion 
as evidence of an Establishment Clause rule prohibiting generic 
harm.290 But again, there is a more plausible reading. Cutter 
held that RLUIPA was constitutional because it both “allevi-
ate[d] . . . burdens on private religious exercise” and “[took] ade-
quate account of the burdens . . . on nonbeneficiaries.”291 In other 
words, unlike the Sabbath law in Caldor, laws like RLUIPA and 
RFRA do not command gratuitous burden-shifting. On the con-
trary, they mandate accommodations only when a claimant 
demonstrates a “substantial burden” on her religious exercise—
an actual conflict between one’s religious practice and the policy 
at issue.292 Moreover, even if one might worry about an over-
broad reading of that test, these statutes also contain a compel-
ling interest limitation, ensuring that the kind of “unyielding 
weighting” at issue in Caldor will never arise.293 True, the Court 
in Cutter cautioned that, if RLUIPA were used to impose “unjus-
tified burdens,” the Establishment Clause would prohibit it.294 
But the point of that observation, as in Caldor, was about redis-
tribution that is both baseless and costly. Were RLUIPA used as 
a pretext to command significant cost-shifting unconnected to 
relieving any burden on religious practice, there is no doubt the 
Establishment Clause would prohibit it. 
Read together, Caldor and Cutter suggest that there is in-
deed a special Establishment Clause concern arising from  
accommodations that shift costs. But that concern is not over the 
 
 290 See notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
 291 Cutter, 544 US at 720. The Court also noted that RLUIPA’s text indicated that it 
would be “administered neutrally among different faiths.” Id. 
 292 See 42 USC §§ 2000bb-1(a)–(b), 2000cc-1. To be sure, the question as to how ex-
actly courts ought to approach the substantial burden inquiry is itself an area of vigor-
ous scholarly disagreement. For a few different perspectives, see Ira C. Lupu, Where 
Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 Harv L Rev 
933, 966 (1989) (arguing that a substantial burden occurs when “religious activity is met 
by intentional government action analogous to that which, if committed by a private  
party, would be actionable under general principles of law”); Michael A. Helfand, Identi-
fying Substantial Burdens, 2016 U Ill L Rev 1771, 1793 (arguing that courts ought to 
focus on the “substantiality of the civil penalty”); Chad Flanders, Substantial Confusion 
about “Substantial Burdens”, 2016 U Ill L Rev Online 27, 29 (arguing that a substantial 
burden on religion involves “the quantum of pressure that is put on a person to violate 
his religious beliefs—that means any part of his religious beliefs, and for any amount of 
time”). 
 293 See 42 USC §§ 2000bb-1(a)–(b), 2000cc-1. See also Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2781 
n 37 (observing that a concern over “the burdens a requested accommodation may impose 
on nonbeneficiaries . . . will often inform the analysis of the Government’s compelling 
interest and the availability of a less restrictive means of advancing that interest”). 
 294 Cutter, 544 US at 726. 
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presence of third-party harm. Rather, it is over the connection 
between an accommodation’s costs and the lifting of an actual 
burden on religious practice. When claims for accommodation 
outrun any actual burden on free exercise while also imposing 
significant costs, there are good reasons to believe they are un-
justified attempts to reward a favored religious identity. By con-
trast, when an accommodation incidentally redistributes costs 
as part of a transparent effort to protect religious freedom, there 
is generally no reason to believe it raises any Establishment 
Clause concern. Rather, it is just one more instance—like ac-
commodations for disability, pregnancy, and so on—in which the 
law adjusts benefits and burdens to account for things many 
people care about. 
But of course, there is also another potential problem. In 
most instances, bestowing a gratuitous and costly benefit on a 
religious claimant will be sufficient evidence that an accommo-
dation is a pretext to reward religious conformity. But what 
about instances in which a burden on free exercise is actually 
present, but an accommodation’s costs seem radically dispropor-
tionate? A religious exemption for a group that engages in hu-
man sacrifice would undoubtedly lift a religious burden, but no 
one would ever think such a carve-out from homicide laws is jus-
tified. And indeed, that kind of concern seems at least vaguely 
implied by Cutter’s observation that “an accommodation must be 
measured so that it does not override other significant inter-
ests.”295 How are we to think about such laws? 
One possibility, and the one most closely resembling the 
third-party thesis, would be to insist that an accommodation is a 
pretext for favoritism whenever it results in more than a mini-
mal cost, no matter the religious interest at issue. The Court has 
never endorsed that approach as a matter of Establishment 
Clause doctrine. But it has sometimes employed it as a matter of 
statutory interpretation. In Trans World Airlines, Inc v  
Hardison,296 for instance, the Court considered the meaning of 
Title VII’s command that employers provide “reasonable ac-
commodations” for their employees’ religious needs.297 Notwith-
standing the fact that the statute explicitly requires accommo-
dation unless the employer “demonstrates [ ] he is unable to . . . 
 
 295 Id at 722. 
 296 432 US 63 (1977). 
 297 Id at 69. See also 42 USC § 2000e(j).  
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[provide them] without undue hardship,”298 the Court insisted 
that any cost that is “more than . . . de minimis” presents such a 
hardship.299 According to the Court, requiring costs above this 
threshold without “giv[ing] other employees the days off that 
they want” risked “unequal treatment” on the basis of religion.300 
The Court’s holding in Hardison is dubious for a number of 
reasons. By definition, de minimis costs are not hardships (much 
less “undue” hardships), and the statutory context provides no 
reason to think that Congress meant otherwise.301 But even set-
ting this point aside, the Court’s reasoning seems callous and 
wooden. The majority worried that applying Title VII’s religious 
accommodation as written could mean that other employees 
may not get “the days off that they want.”302 But not all schedul-
ing requests are of similar magnitude. Requesting an absence to 
observe Yom Kippur or Good Friday is different from a request 
to attend a beer festival, and it trivializes the former to suggest 
that they are not. Moreover, the Court’s approach to the problem 
ignored the ways that many employment-related accommoda-
tions—for disability, pregnancy, and other things—regularly 
generate more than de minimis costs. These are the kinds of 
needs analogous to religious ones in seriousness and importance. 
Yet the Court in Hardison focused solely on the cost side of the 
equation with no regard for the significance of the activity being 
protected or the usual rules applying to such laws. 
A more plausible approach to the problem would begin by 
recognizing that legislatures possess broad discretion to protect 
important interests, and religious interests are no exception. Yet 
that discretion is not limitless. Since the Founding, the right to 
free exercise has always been considered defeasible in the face of 
exceedingly powerful threats to “private rights or the public 
peace.”303 Indeed, as Professor Michael McConnell has observed, 
no fewer than nine state constitutions at the Founding included 
 
 298 Hardison, 432 US at 73–74, quoting 42 USC § 2000e(j). 
 299 Hardison, 432 US at 84. 
 300 Id. 
 301 See id at 92 n 6 (Marshall dissenting) (“As a matter of law, I seriously question 
whether simple English usage permits ‘undue hardship’ to be interpreted to mean ‘more 
than de minimis cost.’”). See also Adeyeye v Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F3d 444, 
455 (7th Cir 2013) (observing that, by its plain language, “Title VII requires proof not of 
minor inconveniences but of hardship, and ‘undue’ hardship at that”). 
 302 Hardison, 432 US at 84. 
 303 Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in Gaillard 
Hut, ed, 9 The Writings of James Madison 1819–1836 100 (G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1910). 
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provisions limiting the right to free exercise to “actions that 
were ‘peaceable’ or that would not disturb the ‘peace’ or safety’ of 
the state.”304 The same basic idea appears repeatedly in  
Founding-era arguments about free exercise in the courts.305 And 
in terms of modern doctrine, that traditional limitation is most 
clearly analogous to the requirement—made explicit in statutes 
like RFRA—that an accommodation ought to be denied when 
applying the law to a claimant is the least restrictive means of 
furthering a compelling governmental interest. 
Viewing the compelling interest test as the outer boundary 
for even for accommodations that relieve genuine burdens on re-
ligious practice makes sense for several reasons. First, it 
grounds the inquiry about disproportionate accommodations in 
historical practice. As a general matter, attempts to weigh bur-
dens on religious practice against other kinds of interests suffer 
from an obvious difficulty—namely, the lack of a shared base-
line.306 We simply lack a common measure for weighing the im-
portance of practicing one’s religion against other important 
concerns. The compelling interest test deals with that problem 
by overruling the legislature’s power to grant accommodations 
in only the most extreme cases—cases in which the law at issue 
lies outside the traditional pattern of religious accommodation 
and thus cannot be seen as simply one more policy choice by the 
legislature. 
Second, viewing the compelling interest test as the key to 
identifying disproportionate accommodations provides a sensible 
way of pinpointing illegitimate attempts to reward religious con-
formity. As we have observed, religious accommodations are 
clearly designed to protect a constitutional interest in free  
 
 304 McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1461 (cited in note 1). To be sure, the precise 
meaning of these provisions has been the subject of intense debate. Compare  
Hamburger, 60 Geo Wash L Rev at 918–21 (cited in note 1) (arguing that these provisos 
in state constitutions implied that government could “deny religious freedom, not merely 
in the event of violence or force, but, more generally, upon the occurrence of illegal ac-
tions”), with Michael W. McConnell, Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights 
of Conscience?: A Critique of Justice Scalia’s Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 39 Wm & Mary L Rev 819, 841–46 (1998) (arguing that Professor Philip  
Hamburger’s interpretation cannot be squared with the text and drafting history of nu-
merous state constitutions). 
 305 See McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1503–05 (cited in note 1) (describing several 
of these court cases) 
 306 See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a 
Response to the Critics, 60 Geo Wash L Rev 685, 705 (1992) (suggesting that such 
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exercise whether the Free Exercise Clause strictly requires them 
or not. Yet the constitutional claims most closely analogous to 
that interest—namely, claims under the Free Speech Clause and 
the Equal Protection Clause—are also limited by the strict scru-
tiny inquiry as a matter of course. Viewing religious accommo-
dations as bounded by these same standards suggests that gov-
ernment may adjust benefits and burdens to protect religious 
interests only as far (but no further) than the law protects other 
kinds of analogous constitutional rights. And in this way, it 
guarantees that accommodations are not just a pretext for re-
warding religious behavior. 
To be sure, there is more to be said. But at the very least, 
the basic point should be clear. Far from being indifferent to the 
costs of accommodation, the Establishment Clause takes them 
into account. But in separating permissible accommodations 
from impermissible ones, the key question is not whether an ac-
commodation produces “harm.” Rather, the question is whether 
an accommodation aims at inducing religious conformity by of-
fering unjustified rewards. 
B. Other Considerations 
Let’s return to the initial objection. The most obvious argu-
ment against my proposal that the Establishment Clause is best 
seen as a ban on government-induced religious conformity is 
that such a proposal does not account for the costs of accommo-
dation. But that objection fails. Properly understood, the  
Establishment Clause ban on government-induced conformity 
includes not only attempts to entice citizens toward religion but 
also attempts to use accommodations as a pretext for rewarding 
groups of citizens who have already chosen to conform. More 
specifically, the Establishment Clause prohibits accommoda-
tions that offer benefits to religious claimants far outstripping 
any supposed burden on private free exercise as well as accom-
modations that command burden-shifting so disproportionate 
that the inference of unjustified favoritism is undeniable. When 
a law commands those things, the Establishment Clause clearly 
prohibits it. 
But does that explanation really go far enough? For in-
stance, although it is rare, accommodations do sometimes au-
thorize significant harms that might not be prohibited by the 
compelling interest test. To use one example that I find particu-
larly troubling, a nontrivial number of states exempt parents 
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from child neglect prosecutions if they fail to seek basic medical 
treatment for their children for religious reasons.307 Yet enforc-
ing those laws against every unwilling parent may not actually 
be mandated by the strict scrutiny inquiry, primarily because in 
many cases there will be a less restrictive alternative: a state 
could merely require religious parents to report the situation 
and provide treatment directly.308 In situations like these, even 
the strict scrutiny limitation may leave us with unsatisfying  
results. 
Moreover, even assuming that the Establishment Clause 
limits disproportionate accommodations in the ways I suggest, 
the question about how certain kinds of conflicts ought to be  
analyzed under the strict scrutiny test can itself be a matter of 
vigorous disagreement. For example, the question of how this 
inquiry relates to claims for exemptions from public accommoda-
tions laws continues to divide scholars—even those deeply com-
mitted to eradicating discrimination.309 And as someone who 
supports both same-sex marriage and religious freedom, it 
seems clear to me that both sides of that debate have a point. 
Repeated denials of service do work a profound and significant 
harm—and one that is not reducible to material considerations 
like the opportunity to obtain the service elsewhere.310 At the 
same time, denying exemptions can also be profoundly damag-
ing, forcing religious individuals to endure financial ruin or 
worse, and often in urban areas where they may already face 
 
 307 See, for example, Ind Code § 35-46-1-4(c)(2); NH Rev Stat Ann § 639:3; NY Penal 
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 309 Compare, for example, Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommoda-
tions, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S Cal L Rev 619, 652 (2015) (argu-
ing that dignitary harm is real and serious but that “the human costs of refusing ac-
commodation are [also] serious” and sometimes justify exemptions), with NeJaime and 
Siegel, 124 Yale L J at 2580 (cited in note 23) (arguing that government’s burden under 
strict scrutiny is usually satisfied when granting an accommodation would “inflict . . . 
dignitary harm on those the statute is designed to protect”). 
 310 See, for example, Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609, 625 (1984) (noting 
that discrimination can “deprive[ ] persons of their individual dignity” and inflict 
“stigmatizing injury”). See also Koppelman, 88 S Cal L Rev at 645 & n 127 (cited in note 
309) (documenting studies linking experiences of discriminatory treatment to negative 
impacts on mental and physical health among LGBTQ people). 
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significant hostility.311 In those contexts, weighing the strength 
of the government interest can be difficult. 
Providing answers to these questions would require a far 
more extensive discussion than can be offered here. Even with-
out definitively resolving these issues, however, there are a few 
things we can say. The first is that, as a matter of actual prac-
tice, judges are extremely squeamish about commanding ac-
commodations that involve significant harm to others. Legisla-
tures might be willing to grant carte blanche exemptions from 
child neglect laws, vaccination requirements, and the like. But 
judges presented with those same claims under RFRA and simi-
lar laws almost never do.312 And indeed, that aversion is so 
strong that even the majority in Hobby Lobby could not bring it-
self to grant an exemption without effectively suggesting that 
the government “pick up the tab” and pay for the contraception, 
although nothing in RFRA actually mandated that result.313 To 
be sure, there may be outliers. But the extant evidence suggests 
that, by and large, when judges are empowered to protect the 
public interest, they do not do so lightly. 
But there is also a second, equally important point. A judge 
faced with an accommodation claim under RFRA or similar 
statutes might ultimately conclude that the government lacks a 
compelling interest in enforcing a law or possesses a less restric-
tive means of furthering its interest. But that judgment does not 
invest courts with the final word on harm. Accommodations are 
ordinary laws. And like all other kinds of legislation, they are 
responsive to the popular will. They can be revised, limited, 
amended, or repealed. And the real-world evidence clearly 
demonstrates that this fact provides an additional and exceed-
ingly powerful limit on the excesses religious accommodations 
 
 311 See, for example, Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 
82 Wash U L Q 919, 945 (2004) (describing repeated efforts of New York–area public 
school officials “to exclude evangelical groups from meeting in the schools on the same 
terms as other voluntary groups”). See also Berg, 38 Harv J L & Gender at 112 (cited in 
note 77) (noting recent polling suggesting that American voters now view evangelical 
Christians substantially less favorably than gays and lesbians). 
 312 See, for example, Workman v Mingo County Board of Education, 419 Fed Appx 
348, 353–54 (4th Cir 2011) (denying a religious exemption from requirement that chil-
dren be vaccinated to attend public school); Sherr v Northport-East Northport Union Free 
School District, 672 F Supp 81, 99 (EDNY 1987) (same); People v Hodges, 10 Cal App 4th 
Supp 20, 30–33 (1992) (denying a religious exemption from laws requiring reporting of 
known child abuse). 
 313 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2787 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
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sometimes threaten, especially in cases involving public accom-
modations or LGBTQ rights. 
Consider just a few of ways that political majorities have 
shaped or revised religious accommodations to soften some of 
the harder edges. Long before Hobby Lobby, legislatures in 
Pennsylvania and Louisiana limited their state RFRAs to apply 
only to nonprofit organizations.314 Those limitations have invited 
some confusion due to drafting problems,315 but they do have an 
obvious upside. If the concern is that accommodations risk 
giving businesses rather than churches or religious individuals 
the power to seek exemptions, that limitation takes care of the 
problem. 
Or consider another strategy that has already been imple-
mented in two very red states. Texas and Missouri both have 
state RFRAs that provide powerful protections for religious mi-
norities. Yet voters in both states drew limits by making those 
RFRAs inapplicable to lawsuits involving civil rights laws.316 
Those limits might stand in some tension with the purpose of re-
ligious accommodation laws by stacking the deck against espe-
cially unpopular religious claimants. But they could also be seen 
as simply clarifying that the people of Texas and Missouri be-
lieve that the government’s interest in enforcing its civil rights 
laws is per se compelling. And that is a choice that the citizens 
of those states are undoubtedly empowered to make. 
A third strategy accomplishes the same end but through 
slightly different means. Recall the firestorm in Indiana a few 
years ago about its newly passed RFRA.317 Critics of the law 
labeled it as a Jim Crow–style assault on LGBTQ rights because 
it explicitly applied to lawsuits brought by private parties, which 
by implication included suits brought under various public 
accommodations laws.318 The likelihood that any judge would 
actually validate a RFRA defense in such lawsuits was 
 
 314 See 71 Pa Stat Ann § 2403 (defining “person” as “[a]n individual or a church, as-
sociation of churches or other religious order, body or institution which qualifies for ex-
emption from taxation”); 13 La Stat Ann § 5234(1) (same). 
 315 See Lund, Keeping Hobby Lobby in Perspective at 303–04 n 79 (cited in note 65) 
(explaining that the statutes invite significant confusion about whether they apply to 
religious schools and other nonprofits because such entities are not always eligible for 
tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code). 
 316 See Tex Civ Prac and Remedies Code Ann § 110.011; Mo Ann Stat § 1.307(2). 
 317 For a reminder, see Robertson and Pérez-Peña, Bills on Religious Freedom (cited 
in note 5). 
 318 See, for example, Tim Cook, Pro-discrimination “Religious Freedom” Laws Are 
Dangerous (Wash Post, Mar 29, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/59YP-492B. 
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disputed.319 But in the end, Indiana’s representatives responded 
by amending its RFRA to exclude discrimination lawsuits from 
its reach, including those involving claims of discrimination 
based on sexual orientation or gender identity.320 
People will differ as to whether these policy choices strike 
the correct balance between religious freedom and other im-
portant concerns. Some will say that they leave religious dis-
senters without adequate protection. Others will say that they 
don’t go far enough in validating LGBTQ rights or employee pro-
tections. But the fact that people will disagree over how harms 
ought to be distributed is precisely the point. Speaking honestly, 
I think the Court was wrong to read the Free Exercise Clause as 
narrowly as it did in Smith and offload many decisions about reli-
gious exemptions to legislatures, where the risk of majoritarian 
bias is high. But whatever one thinks about that issue, one ad-
vantage of religious accommodation statutes is that they allow 
democratic majorities greater flexibility in how their commands 
will be implemented. And indeed, the evidence is fairly clear 
that, when it comes to the most controversial questions, political 
majorities have been exceedingly active in exercising that judg-
ment. 
CONCLUSION 
Ours is a particularly crucial moment in the story of  
American religious liberty. For many important periods in our 
history, religious accommodation has been a laudable feature of 
the American experience. But in the wake of Hobby Lobby, we 
are now asking ourselves whether the cases in which religious 
accommodation and the culture war collide are sufficient reason 
to rethink our tradition. 
In large measure, whether we will choose to retain or aban-
don robust religious accommodation laws will depend on whether 
there is willingness left—among progressives, but more  
 
 319 See Letter from Douglas Laycock, Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of 
Law, University of Virginia School of Law, to Brent Steele, Chair of the Judiciary  
Committee, Indiana Senate *5 (Feb 3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/NK6K-4LG7 
(arguing that “[p]rotecting Americans from discrimination is generally a compelling in-
terest, and few claims to exemption from anti-discrimination laws are likely to succeed”). 
 320 See Ind Code § 34-13-9-0.7. The law applies to numerous municipalities within 
Indiana that protect sexual orientation and gender identity through local ordinance. See 
Indiana: LGBT Non-discrimination in the States (Freedom for All Americans, Feb 7, 
2018), archived at http://perma.cc/YR85-VHRC (listing municipalities in Indiana that 
provide such protections). 
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importantly among conservatives—to see accommodation as 
something more than a symbolic weapon in the culture war. In-
deed, the fate of religious accommodation as a practice may well 
depend on whether we can find ways to preserve the role of ac-
commodations in protecting religious minorities without run-
ning roughshod over other important interests—especially those 
surrounding nondiscrimination and LGBTQ rights. 
In the meantime, however, we do well to resist certain 
temptations. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously remarked 
that “hard cases make bad law.”321 We ought to heed his advice, 
especially when interpreting the Establishment Clause. The 
idea that the Establishment Clause prohibits “harmful” accom-
modations might sound appealing, especially when we are 
thinking about culture war issues. But it is ultimately unworka-
ble as a legal rule and is at odds with our tradition and the best 
of our practices. The debate over religious accommodations will 
be resolved sooner or later, and probably in a way that leaves 
purists on both sides unsatisfied. But however that happens, it 
is to our benefit to develop an interpretation of the  
Establishment Clause that is faithful to history and sensible in 
light of precedent. 
The Establishment Clause is not a cure-all for the problems 
sometimes accompanying religious accommodation. Rather, it is 
a guarantee that government can’t use its power to control the 
religious lives of its citizens. As such, Establishment Clause  
limits on accommodation—like accommodations themselves—
are about furthering freedom for everyone, religious or not. They 
ensure that, whether one chooses to practice a religion or refrain 
from practicing one, the choice to do so is really one’s own. And 
in that way, they preserve religious freedom, a freedom that has 




 321 Northern Securities Co v United States, 193 US 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes  
dissenting). 
 322 2 Annals of Congress 1871 (Dec 22, 1790) (“It is the glory of our country . . . that 
a more sacred regard to the rights of mankind is preserved than has heretofore been 
known.”). 
